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HONOUR'S ROLE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL STATES' SYSTEM*
ALLEN Z. HERTZ*
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Studying the First World War's origins, James Joll (1918-1994), Professor of
International History at the University of London, offered this insight: "In the late
20th century we perhaps find it easier to conceive of foreign policy as being
motivated by domestic preoccupations and by economic interests than by...
considerations of prestige and glory. It does not necessarily follow that the men of
1914 thought in the same way as we do."' To recapture that age which ended
during the First World War, this essay analyzes the meaning of "honour" as a
staple of European political philosophy. The significance of the "word of honour"
is then located in the context of European courtly society, where a king's honour is
explored in relation to that of his country and in the "international of kings" that
was the European States' system until 1917-18. Attention is then directed to
discourse about "honour" and "interest" as rhetoric of British foreign policy. It is
suggested that the idea of honour was at that time consciously exploited for
political ends. Examples are used to show that countries actually fought for
honour, which is portrayed as one of the causes of the First World War, and
directly relevant to Great Britain's decision to confront Germany in 1914.
Thereafter, focus shifts to "national honour" as recognized by public international
law, breach of which then met the sanction of dishonour. Attention is paid to
wartime interest in a new legal paradigm and its reception by the governments in
London and Washington. This is followed by a description of the architecture of
the 1919 peace settlement, which embodied a new law-based order, antithetic to
both honour and aristocratic diplomacy. Finally, the shift from honour to law is
tested by looking at the discourse used at the League of Nations when Hitler
unilaterally denounced key treaty provisions.
A. What is Honour?
An answer comes from French magistrate, parliamentarian, historian and
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aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859):
(1) It first signifies the esteem, glory, or reverence that a man receives from his
fellow men; and in this sense a man is said 'to acquire honour' (conqu~rir de
l'honneur). (2) Honour signifies the aggregate of those rules by the aid of which
this esteem, glory, or reverence is obtained. Thus we say that 'a man 2has always
strictly obeyed the laws of honour'; or 'a man has violated his honour,.
According to German archivist and military historian Karl Demeter: "Honour
can be either a condition or a reflex, subjective or objective: it can be purely
personal or it can be collective." 3 Similarly, University of Chicago anthropologist
Julian Pitt-Rivers observed: "Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but
also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to
pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized
by society, his right to pride." 4 Honour is a manifestation of what U.S. political
philosopher Francis Fukuyama describes when he points to man's desire for
recognition: "People believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people
treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the emotion of
anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they
feel shame, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth,
they feel pride."5
Honour's significance is something the 21 st century grasps poorly, because as
honour, the concept is now virtually obsolete and the "vocabulary of honour has
acquired archaic overtones in modem English.",6 De Tocqueville shrewdly
perceived that honour's obsolescence parallels the eclipse of aristocracy: "The
dissimilarities and inequalities of men gave rise to the notion of honor; that notion
is weakened in proportion as these differences are obliterated, and with them it
would disappear." 7 Thus, the shift from an aristocratic to a bourgeois culture
caused aristocratic honour to fade in favour of middle-class public opinion--the
latter perhaps featuring as frequently in modem political discourse as did the
former in previous times. 8 However, an important subset of what was once called
2.
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3. KARL DEMETER, THE GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS IN SOCIETY AND STATE 1650-1945 Part 3:
Honour 111 (Angus Malcolm trans., London, 1965) [hereinafter GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS].
4. Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF
MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 21 (J.G. Peristiany ed., London 1965) [hereinafter Honor and Social
Status]; for links to hierarchy and self-consciousness, see NORBERT ELIAS, THE GERMANS: POWER
STRUGGLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HABITUS IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 96
(Michael Schroter ed., New York, 1996).
5. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xvii (New York, 1992).
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honour survives today in the narrower
detailed examination of the goals of
Raymond Aron (1905-1983) argued:
satisfactions of amour-propre, victory
called material satisfactions, such as the

concept of prestige among States. 9 In a
foreign policy, French political scientist
"Political units are in competition: the
soor prestige, are no less real than the
l
gain of a province or a population."' o

The Duke of Wellington probably never said "the battle of Waterloo was won
on the playing-fields of Eton," but dlite education in Europe specifically tried to
inculcate a cult of honour, in part to support the officer corps." Thus, honour was
identified as an essential component of "the genius for war" by Prussian soldier
and writer Carl von Clausewitz (1780-183 1):
Of all the noble feelings... in the exciting tumult of battle, none... are so
powerful and constant as the soul's thirst for honour and renown, which the
German language treats so unfairly... in the words Ehrgeiz (greed of honour) and
Ruhmsucht (hankering after glory) .... Has there ever been a great Commander
destitute of the love of honour, or is such a character even conceivable?12

But, Clausewitz caustically criticised courtly 18"h century generals so taken with
"the conception, Honour of Victory" that they failed to exploit their triumph by

vigorously pursuing the enemy.13

Proposing the Legion of Honour's creation, Napoleon remarked (May 4,
1802): "1 do not believe that the French people love liberty and equality. The
French are not changed by ten years of revolution. They are what the Gauls were,
proud and frivolous. They believe in one thing: Honor!"' 14 Similarly, Swiss
historian Jacob Christoph Burckhardt (1818-1897) observed that honour "has
become, in a far wider sense than is commonly believed, a decisive rule of conduct
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 247-65 (Terence Ball et al. eds., Cambridge, 1989); Bemadotte E. Schmitt, The
Relation of Public Opinionand ForeignAffairs Before and During the First World War, in STUDIES IN
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY IN HONOUR OF G.P. GOOCH 322-30 (Arshag Ohan Sarkissian ed., London,
1961); for aristocratic honour's replacement by a bourgeois moral code, see Elias, supra note 4, at 9697; see also Jean Renoir's film La Grande Illusion (Home Vision Entertainment 1937).
9. See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 30-34 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1981).
10. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 91 (Richard
Howard and Annette Baker Fox trans., New York 1966).
11. See ELIZABETH LONGFORD, WELLINGTON: THE YEARS OF THE SWORD 16-17 (Harper & Row
1969); for British officers' honour at Waterloo, see JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE: A STUDY OF
AGINCOURT, WATERLOO AND THE SOMME 189-92 (The Viking Press 1976); for military honour, see
GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS, supra note 3, at 110-54; NORMAN DIXON, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

MILITARY INCOMPETENCE 196-207 (Basic Books 1976); for dlite education, see GWYN HARRIESJENKINS, THE ARMY IN VICTORIAN SOCIETY 277-78 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1977); D. C. B. LIEVEN,
RUSSIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 83-86 (St. Martin's Press 1983) [hereinafter

Russia]; DOMINIC LIEvEN, THE ARISTOCRACY IN EUROPE, 1815-1914 161-64, 171-72, 177, 191-92,
195-96 (Macmillan 1992) [hereinafter ARISTOCRACY IN EUROPE]; HAROLD NICOLSON, SIR ARTHUR
NICOLSON, FIRST LORD CARNOCK: A STUDY INTHE OLD DIPLOMACY 7-8 (Constable & Co. 1930).
12. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR bk. I, ch. 3:146 (Anatol Rapoport ed. and J.J. Graham
trans., Penguin Books 1968).
13. Id. atbk. IV, ch. 12:352.
14. SANCHE DE GRAMONT, THE FRENCH PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 309 (Putnam 1969).
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for the cultivated Europeans of our own day, and many who still hold faithfully by
religion and morality are unconsciously guided by this feeling in the gravest
decisions." 15

The same bourgeois experience was recently described by Yale University
historian Peter Gay who indicts 19th century honour-fixated societies for spawning
hatred:
Touchiness on the great matter of honor was extreme. All significant aspects of
life--rites of passage, social intercourse, the choice of a mate, orders of rank and
precedence, even commercial transactions--were meticulously regulated and
subject to obsessively enforced rituals. Affronts, whether real or trumped up, had
to be avenged with the most extreme remedies at hand .... Men felt compelled to

display and continuously reaffirm their manhood from the time they were
striplings, to prove their hardihood, their sheer physical strength, and their
tenacious endurance of the bodily suffering that their risk-seeking lives
necessarily entailed. For societies living by heroic codes, prestige was the
cherished aim, pain the necessary test, disgrace a perpetual threat; autonomy was
sacrificed to the good opinion of others. 16
B. Was Honour a Staple of PoliticalPhilosophy?
"Honour" was until the 20th century a central construct in European sociopolitical thought and a commonplace in works of law and political philosophy.
Niccol6 Machiavelli (1469-1527) was a Florentine public servant, diplomat and
political writer. Following a 14th century trail blazed by Petrarch, 17 Machiavelli
deplored Christianity's emphasis on humility and heaven. He instead urged
individual virtii (manliness, courage, pluck, fortitude, boldness, valour,
steadfastness, tenacity)' 8 to gain honour and glory-perhaps man's highest
pleasure. 19 Machiavelli's writings reveal honour's several faces which are
generally linked to virti. According to U.S. political theorist Leo Strauss (18991973):
For Machiavelli, the honorable is that which gives a man distinction or which
makes him great and resplendent. Hence extraordinary virtue rather than ordinary
virtue is honorable. To possess extraordinary virtue and to be aware of one's
possessing it is more honorable than merely to possess it. To have a sense of

15.

JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE

IN ITALY

304 (S.G.C.

Middlemore trans. and Irene Gordon ed., Modem Library 1960).
16. PETER GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED 112 (W M Norton & Co. 1993).
17. See QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT; VOL. ONE:
THE RENAISSANCE 100 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1978).
18. Relevant 161 century meaning survives in 1 OSCAR BULLE & GIUSSEPE RIGUTINI,
DIZIONARIO ITALIANO-TEDESCO E TEDESCO-ITALIANO 905 (Leipzig-Milan, 1896); for Machiavelli,
vir was whatever qualities the prince needed "to keep his state," see, SKINNER supra, note 17, at vol.

1:138.
19. See LEO STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI 189, 291 (The Free Press 1958).
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one's superior worth and to act in accordance with that sense is honorable. Hence
it is honorable to rely on oneself and to be frank when frankness is dangerous. To
show signs of weakness or to refuse to fight is dishonorable. To make open war
against a prince is more honorable than to conspire against him. To lose by
die fighting is more
fighting is more honorable than to lose in
20 any other way. To
honorable than to perish through famine.
Although Machiavelli was outstanding in stressing dissimulation and even
brutality, he was entirely with his contemporaries in seeing honour, glory and fame
as the prince's ultimate goal.2 '
The image of the "gentleman," including the cult of honour, was a
Renaissance icon. 22 Italian historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini (14831540) included many references to honour, good name, reputation, dignity,
greatness, glory and fame in his celebrated Ricordi composed over the years from
1512 to 1530.23 The emphasis on honour was also natural for Emperor Charles V
who was steeped in chivalry as Grand Master of the Burgundian Order of the
Golden Fleece. When chided for failing to follow Julius Caesar in fully exploiting
victories, Charles replied: "The ancients had only one goal before their eyes,
honor. We Christians have two, honor and the salvation of the soul. ' 24 In
entrusting Spain to his son Philip II, Charles advised (1543) Philip "to take as
examples all those who have made good their want in age and experience by their
courage and zeal in the pursuit of honour"25and to study as "the only means by
which you will gain honour and reputation.,
Some years later, French lawyer and political philosopher Jean Bodin (15301596) divided social rewards into the profitable and the honourable, with a
preference for the latter: "For as a generous and noble minded man doth more
esteem honour than all the treasure of the world; so without doubt he will willingly
sacrifice his life and goods for the glory he expects-and the greater the honours
be, the more men there will be of merit and fame. 26 This was consistent with the
understanding of French magistrate and essayist, Michel de Montaigne (1533-

20. STRAUSS, supra note 19, at 235-236.
21. See SKINNER, supra note 17, at vol. 1:100-01, 118-21, 130-32.
22. See J. H. PLUMB, THE HoRIzON BOOK OF RENAISSANCE 313-19 (American Heritage
Publishing Co 1961); J. H. PLUMB, THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE: A CONCISE SURVEY OF ITS HISTORY
AND CULTURE 119-125 (Harper & Row 1965).

23. See FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, RIcORDII (1st ser.) §§ 1, I1,18-9, 34, 45, 57, 59-60, 69, 73,
87, 89, 105-6, 125, 137-38, 141, 149, 151, 164, 167-68, 174; 2 ndser., §§ 4, 15-17, 32, 42, 44, 72-3, 86,
104, 118, 133, 142, 150, 157-58, 179, 181, 192, 194, 202, 217, 219 (Ninian Hill Thomson trans., S. F.
Vanni 1949).
24. JACOB BURCKHARDT, ON HISTORY AND HISTORIANS 123 (Harry Zohn trans., Harper & Row
1965).
25. The full text of the 1543 Political Testaments are in KARL BRANDI, THE EMPEROR CHARLES
V: THE GROWTH AND DESTINY OF A MAN AND OF A WORLD-EMPIRE 486-87 (C.V. Wedgewood trans.,
Jonathan Cape 1965).

26.
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THE SIx BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE: A FACSIMILE REPRINT OF THE
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1606,
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AND
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THE LIGHT
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COMPARISON WITH THE FRENCH AND LATIN TEXTS 585-86 (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1962).
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1592): "Of all the delusions in the world, the most fully accepted and most
universal is the seeking for fame and glory, which we espouse to the point of
giving up wealth, repose, life, and health, which are real and substantial goods, to
follow that airy phantom...27
In late 16th century England, Shakespeare's plays put relatively strong
emphasis on "honour., 28 And, in the same English context, Oxford University
Regius Professor of Civil Law, Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) included a chapter on
"conflict between what is honourable and expedient" in his Three Books on the
Law of War: "Honour (honestas) is so highly valued that it takes precedence over
what is lawful, and may even be sought at the expense of a certain amount of
injustice. For the sake of honour (honestatis caussa), says Augustine, we should
give up what is lawful but would be advantageous only to a part of mankind., 29 A
generation later, Dutch diplomat, lawyer and father of international law Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645) discussed, with reference to wartime, "with what
30 meaning a
sense of honour (pudor) may be said to forbid what the law permits."
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
honour31 which he carefully defined:

was preoccupied with

The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is
called honoring and dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate is to
honor him, at a low rate is to dishonor him. But high and low, in this case,
is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man sets on
himself32

French lawyer, political philosopher and aristocrat Charles de Montesquieu
(1689-1755) identified honour as the key principle distinguishing monarchies,
from republics on the one hand, and from despotisms on the other.33 Honour was

27. Montaigne, Of Not Giving Away One's Glory, in I ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE bk. I, ch. 41:341
(George B. Ives trans., Cambridge, Mass., 1925).
28. See JOHN BARTLETT, A NEW AND COMPLETE CONCORDANCE OR VERBAL INDEX TO WORDS,
PHRASES AND PASSAGES IN THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY
CONCORDANCE TO THE POEMS (Macmillan and Co. 1896), e.g., in descending no. of cols. per entry:
"love," "loved," "lover" & "loving" (28.5); "king" & "kingdom" (17.3); "speak" (13); "time" (13);
"heart" (12); "true," "truly" & "truth" (11); "honour," "honourable" & "honoured" (10); "heaven" (9.2);
"life" (9); "fear" & "fearful" (8); "word" (8); "world" (7.2); "woman" (7); "grace" (6); "soul" (5.5);
"hope" (4.8); "desire" & "desired" (4.6); "wit" (4.6); "war" (4.5); "wisdom" & "wise" (4); "state" (4);
"tear" (4); "wrong" (4); "virtue" (3.6); "law" & "lawful" (3.5); "favour" (3); "home" (3); "spirit" (3);
"faith" (2.5); "fault" (2.5); "sorrow" (2.5); "swear" (2.5).
29. Alberico Gentili, On Conflict Between Honour and Expediency (Si utile cum honesto pugnet),
in DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES bk. 11I,ch. 12: vol. 1 at 572 (Latin); vol. 2 at 350 (English). (James Brown
Scott ed. Oxford 1933).
30. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES bk. III, ch. 10, § 1:716 (James Brown
Scott ed., New York, 1925).
31. See RICHARD PETERS, HOBBES 142 (2nd ed. Penguin Books 1967).
32. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN part 1, ch. 10:78-86, at 79 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., Prentice
Hall College Edition 1958).
33. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. III, chs. 6-8,
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portrayed as monarchy's actuating spring because nobles serving the king, were
motivated by the quest for position and precedence. But, Montesquieu also saw
honour as a common code limiting the power and guiding the conduct of king and
noble alike: "There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the law, by
religion and honour as submission to the prince's will; but this very honour tells us
that the prince never ought to command
a dishonourable action, because this would
34
render us incapable of serving him."
German philosopher and mathematician Christian Wolff (1679-1754)
provides rich evidence showing that the 18th century was incapable of describing
the international system without referring to honour's vocabulary. Setting out the
"duties of nations to themselves and the rights arising therefrom," his systematic
treatise includes substantive paragraphs on "the necessity of not bringing disgrace
on one's nation," "zeal for the reputation (fama) of one's nation," "what fame
(gloria) is," "the fame (gloria) of a nation,"3 "the desire for fame (gloria)" and
"how far this applies to the ruler of the State.""
"Which man is insensible to the attractions of glory? It is the last passion of
the sage. Even the most austere philosophers cannot uproot it. What are
exhaustion, troubles and dangers in comparison with glory? It is a passion so mad
that I cannot at all conceive how it does not turn everyone's head." 3 6 These were
the words of Prussia's King Frederick the Great (1712-1786) who believed:
A good prince's true merit is to have a sincere attachment to the public good, to
love his country and glory: I say 'glory' because the happy instinct which
animates men with the desire for a good reputation is the real principle of heroic
actions; it is the soul's nerve, awakening it 37from lethargy to carry it towards
useful, necessary and praiseworthy enterprises.

As early as 1790, British parliamentarian and political writer Edmund Burke
(1729-1797) denounced the French Revolution's "grim and bloody maxims" as
antithetical to a unique European notion of honour drawn from medieval chivalry.
For Burke, "the spirit of a gentleman" was fundamental to Europe's civilization:
It was this which, without confounding ranks, had produced a noble equality and
handed it down through all the gradations of social life. It was this opinion which
mitigated kings into companions and raised private men to be fellows with kings.
Without force or opposition, it subdued the fierceness of pride and power, it

10-11; bk. IV, ch. 2; bk. V, chs. 16-19; bk. VI, ch. 21; bk. VIII, ch. 9; bk. XII, ch. 27 (Thomas Nugent
trans., revised by J.V. Prichard Chicago 1952).
34. Id. at bk. IV,ch. 2.
35. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTUM ch. 1,§§ 45-5 1; vol.
1:17-19 (Latin); vol. 2:30-33 (English) (Otfried Nippold ed., Oxford 1934).
36. LES PLUS BELLES PAGES DE FREDERIC II 110-111 (Charles-Adolphe Cantacuz~ne ed. Paris,
1935).
37. Histoire de mon temps, avant-propos de 1775, in I MEMOIRES DE FREDERIC II, Rol DE
PRUSSE: ECRITS EN FRANCAIS PAR LUI-MEME

4-5 (E. Boutaric & E. Campardon eds., Paris, 1866)

[hereinafter MEMOIRES DE FREDERIC II]; Frederick to D'Alembert, Sep. 26, 1770, in 11 OEUVRES
POSTHUMES DE FREDERIC II, Roi DE PRUSSE 88 (Berlin 1788).
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obliged sovereigns to submit to the soft collar of social esteem, compelled stern
authority to submit to3 elegance, and gave a dominating vanquisher of laws to be
subdued by manners. 8
C. The "Word of Honour" and Courtly Society
Keeping a promise as "word of honour" was similar, but not identical to the
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) of natural and canon law, which for
a long time were less effective than honour in encouraging treaty compliance by
successors. As long as there was a sense in which treaties remained the contracts
of kings, performance profited from dynastic honour as a recognized framework
for a son's feeling bound by his father's treaty. This consciousness of family
obligation alleviated difficulties about succession to natural law promises and
transcended the limitations of the oath, by which a king could imperil his own soul,
but not that of his son.
With honour, the context was neither natural nor canon law, but rather a
related socio-religious norm emerging from the ethical and aesthetic ideals of the
late Middle Ages, when-according to Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (18721945)--the "thought of all those who lived in the circles of court or castle was
impregnated with the idea of chivalry" and "permeated by the fiction that chivalry
ruled the world. 39 Pertinent here is the emphasis which medieval chivalry had
placed on vows, steadfastness, "keeping faith" and "remaining true to one's
word.",40 This phenomenon was understood by De Tocqueville who perceptively
saw the link with the key medieval institution of allegiance: "Every man looked up
to an individual whom he was bound to obey; by that intermediate personage he
was connected with all the others. Thus, in feudal society, the whole system of the
commonwealth rested upon the sentiment of fidelity to the person of the lord; to
destroy that sentiment was to fall into anarchy."' Huizinga was understandably
surprised that Belgian lawyer Ernest Nys (1851-1920), after so much study of
international law's history,42 had missed the key contribution of chivalric
ideas-including "fidelity to one's given word., 43 Huizinga was convinced by
14th century sources that "the system of chivalric ideas as a noble game of rules of
38. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 86-90, at 87 (Thomas H.D.

Mahoney ed. MacMillan Publishing Co. 1955).
39. JOHAN HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE

MIDDLE AGES: FORMS OF LIFE, THOUGHT AND ART

IN FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS IN THE XIVTH AND XVTH CENTURIES 67-107 (Doubleday 1954).
40. ROBERT PLUMER WARD, 2 AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

159, 161, 167,
174-88, 205 (London 1795); JAMES KENT, KENT'S COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL Law 26 (J.T.
Abdy ed., 2d. ed. rev., Cambridge 1878); ROBERT REDSLOB, HISTOIRE DES GRANDS PRINCIPES DU
DROIT DES GENS: DEPUIS L'ANTIQUITf JUSQU'A LA VEILLE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE 122 (Paris 1923).
41. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 245-46, supra note 2.
42. See ERNEST NYs, LES ORIGNES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Brussels-Paris 1894).
43. Johan Huizinga, The Politicaland Military Significance of Chivalric Ideas in the Late Middle
Ages, in MEN AND IDEAS: HISTORY, THE MIDDLE AGES, THE RENAISSANCE 196-206, at 204 (James S.
Holmes & Hans van Marie trans., Meridian Books 1959).
OF NATIONS FROM THE TIME OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS TO THE AGE OF GROTIUS
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honor" was linked to international law: "The origins of the latter lay in antiquity
and in canon law, but chivalry was the ferment that made possible the development
of the laws of war. The notion of a law of 4nations
was preceded and prepared for
4
by the chivalric ideal of honor and loyalty."
The enduring focus on honour was reflected in the European obsession with
reputation. For example, scrupulous treaty performance was seen as giving rise to
"true grandeur and solid glory" by Charles Rollin (1661-1741), classical historian
and former Rector of the University of Paris. 4 5 The importance of keeping
promises was also affirmed by Francis Osborne, Duke of Leeds, who resigned
(April 21, 1791) as Foreign Secretary after parliamentary pressure prompted Prime
Minister William Pitt the younger to cancel planned naval demonstrations against
Russia. Because the help of the warships had already been promised to Prussia's
King Frederick William II, Leeds saw personal and national honour lost by
Britain's volte-face.46 In 1864, future Prime Minister Lord Salisbury (as MP Lord
Robert Cecil) emphasized: "One promise is as good as a hundred, and one
disregarded promise casts upon the escutcheon of a country disgrace which is only
'
increased in degree by multiplied repetitions. 47
Evidently, this was a sentiment
understood by U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan (18331911) who opined:
Aside from the duty imposed by the constitution to respect treaty stipulations
when they become the subject of judicial proceedings, the court cannot be
unmindful of the fact that the honor of the government and the people of the
United States is involved in every inquiry48 whether rights secured by such
stipulations shall be recognized and protected.
Lying for reasons of State was similarly condemned roundly by 18th century
diplomat Lord Malmesbury:
No occasion, no provocation, no anxiety to rebut an unjust accusation, no idea,
however tempting, of promoting the object you have in view, can need, much less
justify, a falsehood. Success obtained by one is a precarious and baseless success.
Detection would ruin, not only your own reputation forever, but deeply wound the

44. Id. at 203.
45. See M. Rollin, 2

DE LA MANIERE D'ENSEIGNER ET D'ETUDIER

RAPPORT A L'ESPRIT & AU CEUR

LES BELLES LETTRES, PAR

55-56, 65, 70 (Paris, 1740).

46. Sending ships was "manly and consistent conduct" in conformity with "honour," the contrary
"disgraceful" exhibition of "caution bordering upon timidity," see THE POLITICAL MEMORANDA OF
FRANCIS, FIFTH DUKE OF LEEDS ix-x, 150-174 (Oscar Browning ed., Camden Society, new ser., no. 35,
London 1884); the reversal was arguably consistent with the explicitly defensive 1742 and 1788 AngloPrussian treaties, see 36 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 498-503, and 50 THE CONSOLIDATED

TREATY SERIES 333-338, 354-358 (Clive Parry ed., Oceanna Publication 1969-1981) [hereinafter CTS];
FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM PITT (1792) TO SALISBURY (1902)

1 (Harold

Temperley & Lillian M. Penson eds., Barnes & Noble 1966); for the "armament" against Russia, see
JEREMY BLACK, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS,

1783-1793 285-328

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1994).
47. Jul. 5, 1864, 176 PARL. DEB. (COMMONS) 851 (3rd ser.).

48. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 5 S.Ct. 255 at 256, 28 L.Ed 770 (1884).
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honour of your Court.49

This rhetoric exemplifies the imperative of honouring both truth and promises
that was a key ingredient of the chivalric archetype, perpetuated and transformed
by the "courtly-aristocratic" society, which held sway in Europe until mostly swept
away during the First World War.5
D. Was the King's Honour Nationalized?
By the 18th century, the very old notion of the king's honour had mingled
with the closely related idea of the honour of the State or nation. 5' According to
De Tocqueville: "In some nations the monarch is regarded as a personification of
the country; and the fervor of patriotism being converted into the fervor of loyalty,
they take a sympathetic pride in his conquests, and glory in his power., 52 For
example, King George III explicitly identified his personal honour with that of
Britain-a sentiment seconded by the pseudonymous Junius: "The king's honour is
that of his people. Their real honour and real interest are the same. 53 This link
was no less compelling for soldier-diplomat and adventurer, Sir Robert Wilson
who (1826) urged Parliament "to uphold with a strong hand the honour and interest

49. Sir James Harris, 1st Earl of Malmesbury (1746-1820), quoted by Algernon Cecil, The
Foreign Office, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1783-1919 551 (Sir A.W.
Ward & G.P. Gooch eds., Cambridge 1923); "feelings of morality and honour" caused 2nd Earl of
Malmesbury, James Edward Harris (1778-1841) to resign as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs because national security forced him to lie about Britain's plans to seize the fleet of neutral
Denmark, see 3rd EARL OF MALMESBURY, JAMES HOWARD HARRIS (1807-1889), 1 MEMOIRS OF AN
Ex-MNISTER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 1-2 (London 1884).
50. For the knight/courtier transition and courtly-aristocratic society's enduring impact, see
NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS AND STATE FORMATION AND
CIVILIZATION 168-78, 266-72 (Edmund Jephcott trans., Blackwell 1994); for chivalry's deep mark on
Western civilization, see GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS, supra note 3, at 115; for the pre-1914 "sumptuous
neo-absolutist court culture," see JOHN C.G. ROHL, THE KAISER AND HIS COURT: WILHELM 1IAND THE
GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 70-106 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1994); for 19th century chivalry and its
1914-18 death, see MARK A. GIROUARD, THE RETURN TO CAMELOT: CHIVALRY AND THE ENGLISH
GENTLEMAN 290 (Yale Univ. Press 1981).
51. See Norman Hampson, The French Revolution and the Nationalisationof Honour, in WAR
AND SOCIETY: HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR AND MEMORY OF J.R. WESTERN 199-212 (M.R.D. Foot
ed., London 1973); GEOFFREY BEST, HONOUR AMONG MEN AND NATIONS: TRANSFORMATIONS OF AN
IDEA (Univ. of Toronto Press 1982); for the shift to "national honour" marking nationalism's rise, see
ALFRED VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILITARISM: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY 442-50 (rev. ed. New York

1959); for "collective honour," see HonourandSocialStatus,supra note 4, at 35-36.
52. DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 251, supra note 2; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin,
Representation, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 132-154, at 138 (Terence Ball
et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press) ("It is a medieval and mystical conception: the king is not merely
the head of the national body, not merely the owner of the entire realm, but he is the crown, the realm,
the nation.").
53. Letters from George III to Lord Bute 1756-1766 (Romney Sedgwick ed., London 1939), No.
205, Oct. 22, 1762: 149; Letter to the Printer of the Public Advertiser, Jan. 30, 1771, No. 42, in 2 THE
LETTERS OF JUNIUS 55 (London, 1810); for information about the mysterious Junius, see STANLEY
AYLING, GEORGE THE THIRD (London, 1972), 164-167.
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of the Crown, which in this country are inseparable from the honour and interest of
the people. 54 Similarly, Lord Salisbury said on Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli's death: "The honour of the Crown and the honour of the country were in
his mind inseparable: and in comparison to them, questions of internal policy
occupied a secondary rank.""
Christian Wolff had already taught that "the ruler of a state ought to direct the
royal acts to the glory of his nation (gloria Gentis), consequently to do nothing to
diminish or destroy it."' 56 For him, fame (gloria)meant "ein grosser Nahme" (a
great name): "Fame (gloria) is primarily and of itself attributed to the nation,
because it is considered as a single person, which has its own actions dependent
upon intellectual and moral virtues; but even more is it attributed to it, because the
renown (laus) of individuals is passed over to it on account of acts or deeds which
are considered as those of the individuals."5 7 Similarly, Charles Jenkinson (later
1st Lord Liverpool) was in 1758 comfortable declaiming: "Great and wise
governments have always been jealous of national glory: it is an active principle,
which properly cultivated, operates in virtuous actions through every member of
the State. To preserve this in its purity is the duty of everyone who loves his
country. ' 8
It was entirely natural for France's new National Assembly to speak (1792) of
"the offended dignity of the French people" and for British Foreign Secretary Lord
Grenville to defend "the dignity and honour of England." 59 Similarly, "the glory of
the French people" was rhetoric Napoleon used to encourage soldiers in the 1796
campaign in Italy. 60 After Allied victory at Waterloo (1815), the Duke of
Wellington and other British statesmen judged sparing France's "national honour"
to be a key consideration in framing peace terms.6' In the 19th century such
54.
55.
(George
56.
57.

16 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1826) 336.
Letter to Queen Victoria, Apr. 25, 1881, 3 THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA 216 (2nd ser.)
Earle Buckle ed., London 1926) [hereinafter LQV].
Wolff, supra note 35, at ch. 1, § 51, vol. 1: 19; vol. 2:33.
Wolff, supra note 35, at ch. 1, § 48, vol. 1:18; vol. 2:31-32.

58. CHARLES JENKINSON, A DISCOURSE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT

BRITAIN, IN RESPECT TO NEUTRAL NATIONS, DURING THE PRESENT WAR 7 (2d. ed., London 1759).

59. Statement of French Foreign Policy, Apr. 14, 1792, in DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 284 (John Hall Stewart ed., New York 1951) [hereinafter Documentary Survey];
Grenville to French Ambassador, Marquis de Chauvelin, Dec. 31, 1792, in TEMPERLEY, supra note 46,
at 5.
60. See Proclamation to the Army of Italy, Apr. 26, 1796, in DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, supra note
59 at 672-73.
61. See e.g., BRITISH DIPLOMACY 1813-1815: SELECT DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (C.K. Webster ed., G. Bell and Sons 1921). British Prime Minister
Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool, to Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh negotiating
peace in Paris, Jul. 15, 1815: "It is argued with much force that France will never forgive the
humiliation which she has already received that she will take the first convenient opportunity of
endeavouring to redeem her military glory," id. at 346; Liverpool to Castlereagh, Aug. 18, 1815: "An
arrangement on this principle would have nothing in it which could really be considered as humiliating
to France," id. at 368; Liverpool to Castlereagh, Aug. 23, 1815: "Such a stipulation need not, in our
judgment, mortify the pride of the French nation," id. at 369; Castlereagh to Liverpool, Aug. 24, 1815:
"...if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a point of honour, be
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references to national honour became increasingly common, especially in France,
Britain and the few other countries where control of foreign policy was gradually
shifting to a governing class which, according to British diplomat and historian
Harold Nicolson (1886-1968), developed a corresponding feeling that
"engagements entered into by the government pledged the honour of the class as a
whole." 62 Similarly, British historian A.J.P. Taylor (1906-1990) observed that prepublic
1914 treaties were no longer simply between
63 monarchs, but "absorbed by
opinion" and therefore also between nations.
E. Honour in the Internationalof Kings
During the 18th century, dynastic ties had been so important that mutual
courtesies persisted even during wartime, when contending rulers exchanged
letters of congratulation and condolence. 64 Such monarchical solidarity was
fortified by the challenge of the French Revolution. After France's King and
Queen were arrested (June 21, 1791) at Varennes, Marie Antoinette's brother,
Habsburg Emperor Leopold II wrote to his fellow rulers that the detention violated
"the honor of all sovereigns and the security of all governments. 65 In fact, 19th
century European rulers were an interrelated family, mostly of German descent.
According to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, these kings had "more in common
with the other members of the international princes' trade union ... than with their
own subjects., 66 Similarly, Nicolson portrayed the post-1815 Concert of Europe as
a system of trust operating via the creation of confidence and the acquisition of
credit in an International of Monarchs--a freemasonry of kings.67 Accordingly, he
saw 19th century international relations as resting on "a tacit understanding
between the five Great Powers that there were certain common standards of
dignity, humanity and good faith which should govern the conduct of these powers
in their relations with each other and in their dealings with less potent or less
civilized communities., 68 Nicolson's nostalgia matches the authoritative
contemporary view of longtime Austrian Chancellor Clemens von Metternich
anxious to regain it," id. at 371; British peace negotiator, the Duke of Wellington to Castlereagh, Paris,
Aug. 31, 1815: ".... the measure would afford to France ajust pretence for war, and all the means which
at 374; Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sep. 4, 1815:
injured national pride could give for carrying it on," id.
"...for objects that France may any day reclaim from the particular States that hold them, without
pushing her demands beyond what she would contend was due to her own honour," id. at 376.
62. HAROLDNICOLSON, DIPLOMACY 90-91 (3'ded. MacMillan 1963).
63. A.J.P. Taylor, InternationalRelations, in THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, VOLUME
11: MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS 1870-1898 552 (F.H. Hinsley ed. Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967).
64. See Andrew Lossky, InternationalRelations in Europe, in THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN
HISTORY, VOLUME 6: THE RISE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, 1688-1715/25 168-169 (J. S. Bromley
ed. Cambridge 1970).
65. Padua Circular, Jul. 5, 1791, in DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, supra note 59, at 221-222; Adam
Wandruszka, 2 LEOPOLD 11360-369 (Vienna 1965).
66. Eric J. Hobsbawn, THE AGE OF EMPIRE 1875-1914 149 (London 1987).
67. See Nicolson, supra note 62, at 66-67, 245.
68. Nicolson, supra note 62, at 72.
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whose philosophy of international relations was simply the principle of reciprocity
in a community of States displaying bon proc~ds, i.e. "mutual consideration and
honourable conduct. 69
From the vantage point of the First World War, British international lawyer
Coleman Phillipson reflected that the Concert had functioned tolerably well as
long as governments continued to prize "honour, fidelity and good report" and
have a strong "desire to stand well with their fellows. 7 ° Consonant with these
values was the dictum of former Foreign Secretary and future Prime Minister Lord
Grenville (1802): "Loss of territory might be regained, commerce might be
revived, and industry encouraged and invigorated; but honour and faith, once
forfeited, could never [sic] be repaired but imperfectly." 71 In the same vein, the
future Lord Salisbury, as MP Lord Robert Cecil, insisted (1864) that "loss of
dignity and honour is not a sentiment; it is a loss of power., 72 Avoiding stain of
dishonour was thus a key incentive promoting conformity with the rules making up
a common code.
19th century monarchs and statesmen displayed real anxiety about peer
judgment and frequently appealed to the standard of what would be honourable "in
the eyes of Europe. 73 For example, Queen Victoria facilitated British foreign
69. Prince Clemens Lothar Wenzel von Metternich-Winneburg, I MEMOIRS OF PRINCE
METTERNICH 1773-1815 37 (Prince Richard Clemens Lothar von Mettemich-Winneburg ed. and
Robina Napier trans., New York, 1880).
70. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 50-51 (T.

Fisher Unwin,

1915).
71. May 4, 1802, LORDS, 36 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803 588 (London, 1820).
72. Jul. 5, 1864, 176 PARt,. DEB. H.C. (3d ser.). 851.
73.See Letter to Prime Minister Lord John Russell, Jul. 28, 1850, 2 LQV 306 (1st ser.) (Arthur
Christopher Benson & Viscount Esher eds., London 1907) ("expose herself to insults of other nations");
Letter from Duke of Cambridge, Apr. 28, 1854, LQV, 1st ser., vol. 3:31 ("such position being highly
honourable and advantageous to us in the eyes of Europe"); Letter to Foreign Secretary Lord
Clarendon, Jan. 15, 1856, 3 LQV 207 (1st ser.) ("The Queen... cannot be for peace now, for she is
convinced that this country would not stand in the eyes of Europe as she ought"); Letter to Foreign
Secretary Lord John Russell, Apr. 26, 1860, 3 LQV 505 (1st ser.) ("The Queen... must say that she
would consider it the deepest degradation of this country if she was compelled to appear at the
Emperor's [Napoleon III] Congress"); Letter from Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, Jul. 10, 1870, 2
LQV 24 (2nd ser.) ("the goodwill of Europe"); Letter from Foreign Secretary Lord Derby, May 5, 1875,
2 LQV 389-90 (2nd ser.) ("No French Government would be insane enough to put itself in the wrong in
the eyes of all Europe," and "Moral force goes for much in these days, and the sympathy of nations is
always with the attacked party. In the last war, France was the aggressor, and the opinion of Europe
went with Germany"); Letter from German Crown Princess, Dec. 19, 1877, 2 LQV 578 (2nd ser.)
("Ridicule and contempt England can very well stand, and laugh at the ignorance of the benighted
people that know no better; but England cannot, or rather ought not to, afford to lose her position in
Europe"); Letter from the Prince of Wales, Dec. 23, 1877, 2 LQV 580 (2nd ser.) ("We shall never again
be able to hold up our head in the eyes of the world"); Queen's Priv. Secretary Sir Henry Ponsonby to
Viscount Halifax, Jan. 5, 1878, 2 LQV 590 (2nd ser.) ("maintaining the high position which our nation
holds in the world... the spectacle of indecision and weakness which lowers her in the esteem of the
world"); Letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, Jan. 16,1878, 2 LQV 595 (2nd ser.) ("We shall
become the laughing-stock of Europe and the world!!"); Letter from Grand Duchess of Hesse, Mar. 1,
1878, 2 LQV 605 ( 2nd ser.) ("Is [Foreign Secretary] Lord Derby really going to remain? He it is who
shakes the confidence of all the world in England's policy").
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policy by assiduously exploiting her private correspondence and family reunions to
gather intelligence and cultivate influence in the exalted circle constituted by her
royal relatives abroad. 74 Reminding her Prime Minister of "the importance of
keeping our foreign policy beyond reproach," she said: "Public opinion is
recognised as a ruling power in our domestic affairs; it is not of less importance in
the society of Europe with reference to the conduct of an individual state. To
75
possess the confidence of Europe is of the utmost importance to this country.,
Victoria insisted that "the honour of England" touched her "more nearly than
anyone else." 76 She explained: "What my Ambassador does, he does in my name,
and I feel myself bound in honour thereby, but also placed under an obligation to
take upon myself the consequences. '7 7 Moreover, the Queen claimed to have
"public and personal obligations towards those Sovereigns with whom she
professes to be on terms of peace and amity. 78
At the beginning of the 20th century, King Edward VII was closely involved
in British diplomacy, which ostentatiously exploited his encounters with other
rulers, including the Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov Emperors. Aimed at
ending the old Anglo-French antagonism, his 1903 Paris visit was then seen as
proof of his major role in foreign affairs. 79 However, the resulting Anglo-French
Entente Cordiale (1904), by resolving some bilateral differences, pointed to
Europe's fateful split into two hostile camps-Germany and Austria-Hungary on
the one side, and Britain, France and Russia on the other.80 By then, the traditional
pan-monarchic trust and confidence had waned, mainly because the balance among
the European Powers had shifted so radically in Germany's favour. 8' Yet, kings
kept their keen sense of personal and professional honour and pretended that
diplomacy was still tied to their person, until they almost all lost their thrones
during the First World War.82

74. See DR. F. GOSSES, THE MANAGEMENT OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE FIRST

WORLD WAR, ESPECIALLY DURING THE PERIOD 1880-1914 102-04 (E.C. Van Der Gaaf trans., Leiden
1948).
75. Letter to Prime Minister Lord John Russell, Oct. 18, 1847, 2 LQV 156 (1st ser.).
76. Letter to Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell, Feb. 15, 1864, 1 LQV 158 (2nd set.).
77. Letter to King of Prussia, Mar. 17, 1854, 3 LQV 21 (1st ser.).
78. Letter to Prime Minister Lord John Russell, Nov. 20, 1851, 2 LQV 397 (1st ser.).
79. See KEITH MIDDLEMASs, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF EDWARD VII 152-183 (Doubleday & Co
1972); SIMON HEFFER, POWER AND PLACE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KING EDWARD VII
(Phoenix Giant 1998).
80. On Apr. 8, 1904, France and Great Britain concluded in London three agreements comprising
the Entente Cordiale, see CTS 195, Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco, 198-204; Convention
respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, 205-12; Declaration concerning Siam,
Madagascar and the New Hebrides, 214-16.
81. See F. H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 270 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1963); PAUL KENNEDY, THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 to

2000 215 (Random House 1988).
82. See NICOLSON, supra note 62, at 64; LAMAR CECIL, THE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE,
1871-1914 191 (Princeton Univ. Press 1976); ROHL, supra note 50, at 3-4, 71, 106, 115-120, 122-123,
127-128; THE TIMES SURVEY OF FOREIGN MINISTRIES OF THE WORLD 11 (Zara Steiner ed., Times
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F. "Honour" and "Interest" as Rhetoric of British ForeignPolicy
Compelling linguistic evidence shows that, at least until 1914-18, honour was
one of the key categories for British thinking about foreign policy. Specifically,
talk about international relations almost invariably involved doublets in which one
element points to prestige (honour, glory, dignity, reputation, pride, position,
standing) and another to a political assessment (interest, advantage, security,
safety, victory, defeat, injury). This striking duplex featured in almost every
foreign-policy debate in Parliament, and in a wide variety of State papers and
political writing.
Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace supported augmenting "national glory"
and "public interest," and opposed sacrificing "national dignity" and "national
acquisitions.'8 3 Examples abound in the debate on the 1801 preliminaries of peace
with Napoleon. King George III approvingly said "substantial interests of this
country, and honourable to the British character" and "advantage and honour."
"To maintain the honour and preserve the security of the British Empire" were the
words of Prime Minister Henry Addington. Sir Edmund Hartopp used "beneficial
to our interests and reputation." Foreign Secretary Lord Hawkesbury, Viscount
Limerick, and naval heroes Earl St. Vincent and Lord Nelson said "honourable and
advantageous." William Pitt the younger employed "strength to our security and
lustre to our national character;" "to protect England's honour and maintain her
interests;" and "sources ofjustifiable pride, but grounds of solid security." Charles
James Fox offered "safe and honourable" and "defence of our honour and our
independence." Thomas Grenville protested "neither safe nor honourable." Earl
Temple warned "dangerous to safety, and degrading to honour." Sir William
Windham reproved with "degrading and injurious." William Elliot and Richard
Ellison deplored losing "our honour
and interests." "Dishonourable and insecure"
4
was Earl Carnarvon's verdict.1
Debating whether to aid Portugal (1826), future Lord Chancellor Henry
Brougham offered "security or honour" and "credit and safety." 85 For foreign
affairs, identical or similar doublets were favoured by Queen Victoria who got
back the same from her Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. 6 These doublets
Books 1982).
83. EDMUND BURKE, 2 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 265 (New York 1859).

84. 36 Parliamentary History of England 3 (King George); 16 (Addington); 30 (Hartopp); 39, 48
(Hawkesbury); 159 (Limerick); 184 (St. Vincent); 186 (Nelson); 58, 70-71 (Pitt); 72, 74 (Fox); 51-52
(Grenville); 54-55 (Temple); 130 (Windham); 146 (Elliot); 154 (Ellison); 187 (Camarvon).
85. 16 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1826) 383, 388.
86. For Victoria, see THE QUEEN AND MR. GLADSTONE: 1880-1898 (Philip Guedalla ed. Hodder
& Stoughton 1933), ("dignity & honour as well as the safety of her British & Foreign Empire," id. at
353; "honour and welfare of her great Empire," id. at 437); see also LQV: 1st ser., vol. 2:235
("character and honour of England" and "the peace of Europe"); 1st ser., vol. 2:397 ("interests of her
people, honour and dignity of her Crown"); 1st ser., vol. 3:237 ("honour and interests of this country");
1st ser., vol. 3:395 ('honour, power, and peace of this country"); Ist ser., vol. 3:429-430 ("security of
my dominions and honour of my Crown"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:158 ("imaginary interests" and "a supposed
point of honour"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:231 ("safety and dignity of this country"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:419
("every consideration of honour and every consideration of interest"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:592
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were also exchanged in the impassioned speeches sparked by the 1864 AustroPrussian attack on Denmark.87 And, finally, Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith
and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey joined other MPs in repeatedly referring to
Britain's "interest
and honour" in the fateful August 1914 deliberations on war
88
with Germany.
G. Was Honour Cultivatedfor PoliticalEnds?
Still the centre of Western civilization, pre-1914 Europe had experienced a
curious "persistence of the old regime. ' 89 This antediluvian age was marked by
the enduring social supremacy of court aristocracies, the presence of lesser
nobilities, and the co-optation of the upper middle classes which-in significant
social, cultural and political respects-still aped the conduct and discourse of their
"betters." 90 Because so much of the social and political role of king, court and
aristocracy survived beyond 1900, perpetuated too was a matching ideology. For
example, English literature in the two generations before 1914 often displayed a
special rhetoric-a high, romantic diction that was "essentially feudal language"

("England... prepared to maintain the obligation of Treaties, wherever her honour or her interest may
call"); 2nd ser., vol. 2:501 ("honour and interests of her great Empire"); 2nd ser., vol. 2:580 ("honour
and interests of this country"); 2nd ser., vol. 2:605 ("this country's position reasserted, her vital interests
secured"); 2nd ser., vol. 3:50 ("honour and safety of the country,); 2nd ser., vol. 3:126-127 ("honour,
dignity and safety of the Indian Empire [of her great Indian Empire]"); 2nd ser., vol. 3:464 ("lasting
danger and disgrace to this country"). For Victoria's Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, see LQV:
Letter from Viscount Palmerston, Ist set., vol. 1:203 ("honour of your Majesty's Crown and interests of
your Majesty's dominions"), 2nd ser., vol. 1:140 ("promote the interests of his country and uphold the
honour of your Majesty's Crown"); Letter from Lord Russell, 1st ser., vol. 1:327 ("honour or interests
of the country"), 1st ser., vol. 3:472 ("English interest" and "English honour"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:158
("interests and dignity of your Majesty and the country"); Letter from Edward Geoffrey, Lord Stanley
(later 14th Earl of Derby), 1st set., vol. 1:552 ("highly honourable to your Majesty and advantageous to
this country" and "glorious to British Arms, and so important to British interests"); Letter to Lord
Clarendon Ist ser., vol. 3: 234 ("unwise and undignified"), 2nd ser., vol. 1:315 ("neither English honour
nor English interests"); Letter from Lord Granville, 2nd ser., vol. 2:581 ("honour or interest of your
Majesty").
87. See 176 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1864) (Disraeli: "honourable and intelligible course," id.
at 731,
"honour of England and the peace of Europe," id.at 748, "honour or independence of England," id. at
750; Chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone: "an object dearer to England than her interest-namely...
her honour and duty," id.at 764, "dignity, independence and strength of her [i.e. Russia's] position," id.
at 767-68, "our honour and interests," id.; former and future War Secretary Jonathan Peel: "peace and
honour of the country," id. at 799-800; future Foreign Secretary Edward Henry, Lord Stanley (later 15th
Earl of Derby): "influence, power, and honour of England" id.at 811, "a safe, respected, and
honourable position," id.
at 813).
88. See 65 PARL. DEB., H.C., (5th ser.) (1914) 1810, 1816-17, 1819-23, 1825 (Grey); Aug. 6,
1914: 2074, 2077,2079-80, 2083 (Asquith).
89. See generally ARNO J. MAYER, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE OLD REGIME: EUROPE TO THE
GREAT WAR (Pantheon Books 1981). The economic aspects of Mayer's thesis were rejected by LIEVEN.
See ARISTOCRACY IN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 243-244; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at 265.
90. See KEVIN MCALEER, DUELING: THE CULT OF HONOR IN FN-DE-SIECLE GERMANY 197-99,
203-04 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994); Gay, supra note 16, at 15, 17, 33, 113.
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for preparing young males for self-control, sacrifice, defence and aggression. 9'
"The mid-Victorian cult of retrenchment, economy, rationality and utilitarianism"
had by the 1890's fully given way to an exaggerated love of pomp and show,
including the invention of "traditional" ceremonies.92 Were these early 20th
century societies seeking to popularize king and country
by systematically
93
cultivating an "archaic ethos of heroism, glory and honour"?
Individual battlefield bravery could still be credibly characterized as glorious,
honourable, and courageous, until heroism became largely irrelevant amidst the
horrific mechanization of 1914-18 trench warfare-including barbed wire,
machine guns, artillery barrages, poison gas, and tanks.94 By contrast, U.S. foreign
relations scholar George F. Kennan referred to the halcyon pre-war decades which
still cherished "the romantic-chivalric concept of military conflict: the notion that
whether you won or lost depended only on your bravery, your determination, your
sense of righteousness, and your skill." He said warfare was viewed as "a test of
young manhood, a demonstration of courage and virility, a proving-ground for
virtue, for love of country, for national quality." 95 This dovetails with the 1880
view of Chief of the Great German General Staff, Count Helmuth von Moltke
(1800-1891):
Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream. War is an element of
the world order established by God. In war develop mankind's most noble
virtues: courage and self-denial, loyalty to duty and the spirit of sacrifice--the
soldier gives96his life. Without war, the world would stagnate and lose itself in
materialism.

Similarly, Queen Victoria rhapsodized: "To die for one's country and Sovereign in
the discharge of duty is a worthy and noble end to this earthly life for a soldier. 97

91. See PAUL FUSSELL, THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY 21-23 (Oxford Univ. Press
1975). For Lord Curzon's "elaborate, Latinate style of rhetoric," see DAVID CANNADINE, ASPECTS OF
ARISTOCRACY: GRANDEUR AND DECLINE IN MODERN BRITAIN 81-82 (New Haven-London, 1994).
92. See CANNADINE, supra note 91, at 89-92.

93. See MAYER, supra note 89, at 91; for Germany see, ROHL, supra note 50, at 104; for Russia
see, GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECLINE OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER: FRANCO-RUSSIAN

RELATIONS 1875-1890 417-19 (Princeton Univ. Press 1979); Eric J. Hobsbawn, Mass Producing
Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 263-307

at 281-83 (Eric J.

Hobsbawn & Terence Ranger eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1983).
94. See FUSSELL, supra note 91, at 21; GIROUARD, supro note 50, at 290; cinematographic
expressions include Lewis Milestone, All Quiet on the Western Front (Universal Studios 1930); Stanley
Kubrick, Paths of Glory (MGM/UA Studios 1957); Peter Weir, Gallipoli (Paramount Studios 1981).
95. KENNAN, supra note 93, at 423-424.
96. Berlin, Dec. 11, 1880, Les lois de la guerre sur terre: Lettres de M. le comte de Molike et de
M Bluntschli, in REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE, TOME XIII 80
(1881); for "war as culture," see MODRIS EKSTEINS, RITES OF SPRING: THE GREAT WAR AND THE

BIRTH OF THE MODERN AGE 90-94 (London-New York, 1989).
97. See Letter to India Viceroy, Lord Lytton, Dec. 6, 1878, 2 LQV 651 (2nd ser.).
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H. War as Duel: Did Countries Fightfor Honour?
In Europe, honour continued to hold an astonishingly strong grip on
individual imagination and conduct, as evidenced by persistence into the 20th
century of duelling--an dlite practice sustained by several honour-related ideas,
including the premium on readiness to risk life in a rite affirming masculinity,
courage and character. 98 An early juridical treatment of the well-known link
between honour and duelling is afforded by Bologna University's Giovanni da
Legnano who argued (1360) that duels are fought for one or more of three
reasons--hatred, an accusation's compurgation, or glory (propter gloriam). In the
last case, the duellist seeks the joy of victory, i.e. "to win public glory by the
strength of the body" and "from the disgrace of his fellow and neighbour." 99 This
assessment was confirmed by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who was a scientist,
philosopher, Gray's Inn barrister, and ultimately Lord Chancellor of England:
"Honour that is gained and broken upon another hath the quickest reflexion, like
diamonds cut with facets."' ° His perception is particularly relevant because,
turning to the international realm, Bacon specifically understood war as trial by
combat. lO
The same metaphor caused Italian philosopher of law and cultural history,
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) to observe that the moral theologians'
understanding of war's external justice was based on the custom of duelling
observed by individuals in their private affairs. Through the fortune of arms, divine
providence was said to legitimate the victor's conquests. 0 2 Similarly, Clausewitz
began his classic study On War
by defining conflict between States as "nothing but
03
a duel on an extensive scale."'
Travers Twiss (1809-1897) was Professor of International Law at King's
College, London. Using purum piumque duellum (unstained and upright duel) for
war as international law's ultimate sanction, he insisted that the metaphor was "not
a fiction of Jurists, but a stem reality of International Life" as "the ruins of
98. See VICTOR GORDON KIERNAN, THE DUEL IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: HONOUR AND THE REIGN
OF ARISTOCRACY (Oxford Univ. Press 1988); ROBERT A. NYE, MASCULINITY AND MALE CODES OF
HONOR IN MODERN FRANCE (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); MCALEER, supra note 90; ARISTOCRACY IN
EUROPE, supra note 11 at 195, 199; RUSSIA, supra note 11 at 86; ISTVAN DEAK, BEYOND
NATIONALISM: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HABSBURG OFFICER CORPS, 1848-1918
126-38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
99. GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, TRACTATUS DE BELLO, DE REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO §§ 169174:331-341, at 332, 337 (Thomas Erskine Holland ed. and J.L. Brierly trans., Oxford 1917).
100. Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral, § 55: Of Honour and Reputation, in I THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON, BARON OF VERULAM, VISCOUNT ST. ALBAN AND LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF

ENGLAND 505-06 (James Spedding et al. eds., London 1858-1874).
101. See Certain ObservationsMade Upon a Libel PublishedThis Present Year, 1592, in 8 WORKS

OF FRANCIS BACON 146; for a late reference to wars as "suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice,"
see ConsiderationsTouching a War with Spain, 1624, in 14 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 470.
102. See IV THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO ch. 2, § 964,356 (Thomas Goddard Bergin

& Max Harold Fisch trans., Ithaca-London 1968).
103. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at bk. 1, ch. 1, § 2:101.
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Sebastopol bear convincing testimony."' 1 4 The duel was also the metaphor for
Edward Creasy (1812-1878) who was a Lincoln's Inn barrister, judge and
historian. He asserted a country's "right to repel and to exact redress for injuries to
its honour" as a "right of self-preservation," because "among nations, as among
submit to insult, will be sure to have insults and
individuals, those who tamely
05
outrages heaped upon them."
French prelate and writer Frangois Fdnelon (1651-1715) was a bitter critic of
France's foreign policy. He pointed to Louis XIV's desire for glory as one of the
two causes of the Dutch War (1672-1678) said to have triggered a chain of
conflicts impoverishing France. 10 6 Even a shrewd Realpolitiker like Frederick the
Great believed that some wars were fought for glory, reputation and honour.
Frederick said seeking glory was partly his motive for beginning (1740) the War of
the Austrian Succession and that of the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II for the 1778
War of the Bavarian Succession. 10 7 Experience taught Frederick that respect
accorded by fellow rulers was proportional to success on the battlefield.'0 8 He
classified countries as primarily seeking either "glory" or "wealth." He said States
preferring glory tended towards France, but those preferring wealth towards
England. Differentiating interest from glory, he judged that for France to fight for
the Rhine frontier was a matter of genuine interest, but for France to fight to be
Europe's arbiter sheer vanity.10 9
Avenging insults and defending England's honour was demanded by the
"hard-hating, elegant polemicist" Junius who derided King George III for failing to
fight Spain to enforce Britain's claim to the Falkland Islands:
To depart, in the minutest article, from the nicety and strictness of
punctilio, is as dangerous to national honour, as it is to female virtue. The
woman who admits of one familiarity, seldom knows where to stop, or

104. SIR TRAVERS TwISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES: ON THE RIGHT AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE vi, ix (Oxford 1861).
105. SIR EDWARD SHEPARD CREASY, FIRST PLATFORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (London

1876).
106. Letter to Louis XIV, in 7 OEUVRES COMPLETES DE FENELON, ARCHEVEQUE DE CAMBRAI 510

(Paris, 1850). This "anonymous letter" circulated from around Dec. 1693 and then went to the King's
mistress, Frangoise de Maintenon. See JEAN-CHRISTIAN PETITFILS, LOUIS XIV 536-539 (Paris, 1995).
Saying gloire was one of the main "values behind decision making" does not mean that policy was not
also aimed at enhancing France's security. See John A. Lynn, A Quest for Glory: The Formation of
Strategy under Louis XJV, in THE MAKING OF STRATEGY: RULERS, STATES AND WAR 178-204

(Williamson Murray et al. eds., Cambridge 1994); Ragnhild M. Hatton, Louis XIV and his Fellow
Monarchs, in LOUIS XIV AND EUROPE 16-59 (Hatton ed. London 1976); JOHN B. WOLF, Louis XIV
214 (New York 1968); ARON, supra note 10, at 74.

107. See MEMOIRES DE FREDERIC II, supra note 37, at I Histoire de mon temps 75-77; Mimoires
de 1775 6 1778, in vol. 2: 443; Mimoires de la guerre de 1778, in vol. 2:469.
108. Id. at 1 Histoire de la guerre de sept ans 450.
109. See FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLIANISM: THE DOCTRINE OF RAISON D'ETAT AND ITS
PLACE IN MODERN HISTORY 316 (Douglas Scott trans., London 1957); SIR HAROLD NICOLSON, GOOD

BEHAVIOUR: A STUDY OF CERTAIN TYPES OF CIVILITY 107 (London 1955) ("The idea of glory for
glory's sake never pushed deep roots into the thick soil of the English character. Yet in France such
words as 'gloire' and 'panache'possess even today a certain sentimental value.").
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what to refuse; and when the counsels of a great country give way in a
single instance, when they are once inclined to submission, every step
accelerates the rapidity of their descent.'0
Otherwise pacific, Charles James Fox likewise believed: "Among individuals,
and much more among nations, honour is the most essential means of safety, as it
is the first, and I had almost said the only legitimate ground of war." ''
Showing Napoleon III and William I with foils, Punch portrayed the "point of
honour" and the duel as the metaphor for the war which France began against
Prussia in July 1870.12 Prussia's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck took lifelong
pride in having won twenty-five student duels." 3 This fact must be recalled in
connection with the famous Ems telegram which he edited so as to produce the
abrupt tone which was-according to the then prevailing code of honour
(Ritterkodex)-tantamount to declaring war.' 1 4 With precisely this in mind,
Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Granville said it was "inconceivable that, in the
present state of civilisation, hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen should be hurled
' 15
against like numbers of Germans, on a point limited to a matter of etiquette." "
Also with reference to the Franco-Prussian War, Granville said: "It is sometimes
useful to compare the action of nations and that of individuals, and very often the
conduct of a high-spirited nation and of an honourable man is very much the
same.""16 This discourse of honour was continued by the German Crown Prince
Frederick: "It would surely be no shame to France that has fought bravely, to
confess at last that she has been beaten by an Army equal to hers. No one would
accuse France
of cowardice, or believe that her military honour had not had justice
117
doneto it.,

The duel metaphor was also used by Prime Minister Disraeli to portray
Foreign Secretary Granville's conduct at the 1870-71 London Conference revising
the 1856 Paris Treaty's Black Sea clauses:
Why, the noble Lord went there to vindicate the honour and the interests of his
country; and if the Russian Ambassador had refused the compensation which he
demanded it would have been the noble Lord's duty to coerce the Power which
had first outraged England, and then refused to do the only act which the noble

110. Letter to the Printer of the Public Advertiser, Jan. 30, 1771, No. 42, see 2 THE LETrERS OF
supra note 53; characterized by AYLING, supra note 53, at 164.

JUNIUS 48,

111. Nov. 3, 1801, Commons, 36 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 72.

112. See A Duel to the Death, in 59 Punch 37 (Jul. 23, 1870) (France to Britannia: "Pray stand
back, Madam. You mean well; but this is an old family quarrel, and we mustfight it out!").
113. See GAY, supra note 16, at 258.
114. See GOLO MANN, DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE DES 19. UND 20. JAHRHUNDERTS 379 (Frankfurt
am Main 1958); KOPPEL S. PINSON, MODERN GERMANY: ITS HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION 144-46, and

589 n.31
115.
116.
117.

(New York 1955).
Letter from Granville to Queen Victoria, Jul. 15, 1870, 2 LQV 35 (2nd ser.).
203 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1870) 1754.
German Crown Prince to Queen Victoria, Jan. 3, 1871, 2 LQV 101-02 (2nd ser.).
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Lord could devise in order to remove that stain on her reputation.

133

18
1

In the Annual Message to Congress (1905), President Theodore Roosevelt
proved that honour's rhetoric was not limited to Europe: "This mighty and free
Republic should ever deal with all other States, great or small, on a basis of high
honor, respecting their rights as generously as it safeguards its own." He believed
that "if war is necessary and righteous then either the man or the nation shrinking
from it forfeits all title to self-respect." '"19 A year later, he told Congress that
"honorable men" and an "honorable nation" must choose to fight rather than buy
peace through "sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare." He
said "a beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but the nation or man is
disgraced if the obligation to defend right is shirked."' 120 Referring to the 1898
Spanish-American War, Roosevelt in 1917 reflected: "I believe that war should
never be resorted to when or so long as it is honorably possible to avoid it. I
advocate preparation for war in order to avert war,12 1and I should never advocate
war unless it were the only alternative to dishonor."'
"Nations and States can achieve no loftier consummation than to stake their
whole power on upholding their independence, their honour, and their
reputation."' 122 With these words, German soldier, historian and diplomat Friedrich
von Bernhardi (1849-1930) argued that the State has both the right and the duty to
make war: "If sometimes between individuals the duel alone meets the sense of
justice, how much more impossible must a universal international law be in the
wide-reaching and complicated relations between nations and States!" He insisted

that: "Even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no selfrespecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. By so doing it
would renounce its highest ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be
violated by an injustice, and thus dishonour itself."' 123 Recalling Frederick the
Great, Bernhardi argued: "Cases may occur where war must
be made simply as a
24
point of honour, although there is no prospect of success."1

118. 232 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1877) 725; Arts. 11 and 13, General Treaty for the Re-establishment
of Peace between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey, and Russia, Mar. 30,
1856, in 114CTS 414-15.
119. 5th Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1905, see A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1908 1150, 1152 (James D. Richardson ed., vol. 11, Bureau of
National Literature 1908) [hereinafter Messages and Paper]; SIR NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT
ILLUSION: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF MILITARY POWER IN NATIONS TO THEIR ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ADVANTAGE 139 (3d. ed., Toronto 1911) (quoting President Roosevelt at Stationers' Hall,
London, stating "We despise a nation just as we despise a man who submits to insult. What is true of a
man ought to be true of a nation.").
120. 6th Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1906, see I I MESSAGES AND PAPERS 1181-1228,
1223-24, supranote 119.
121. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, NATIONAL STRENGTH AND INTERNATIONAL DUTY 15

1917).
122.
London
123.
124.

(Princeton

FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR 21 (Allen H. Powles trans.,

1913).
BERNHARDI, supranote 122, at 25.

Id. at46-47.
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Seeing the word honneur in the French text of the Preamble to the League of
Nations Covenant, Oxford University Professor of International Relations Alfred
Eckhard Zimmern (1879-1957) reflected: "Honneur suggests not 'fair play', with
its spacious tolerance and comfortable associations with the world of sport, but the
rigorous punctilio of the tournament and the duel."'' 2 5 Indeed, European foreign
policy before 1914 was frequently formulated and executed by individuals who
dueled or subscribed to the cult of dueling.126 According to Edinburgh University
History Professor Victor Kiernan: "Just as the duelist claimed exemption in his
chosen sphere from ordinary law, monarchs ...and almost equally the small
cliques in control of foreign policy.., set their 'honour' above the common
welfare of mankind." Statesmen and duellists shared an obsession with peer
standing that caused Kiernan to comment: "None of the diplomats and generals of
1914 could risk appearing the first to give way, any more than duellists could resist
the pressure of social opinion.' ' 127 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that,
before 1914, the State was personified as a nobleman with a sense of honour, and
that foreign relations were seen through the prism of the cult of honour accepted
among gentlemen.
I.Was Honour a Cause of the First World War?
Looking at power structures, German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920)
pointed to prestige as a factor influencing foreign policy: "Prestige of power, as
such, means in practice the glory of power over other communities; it means
expansion of power, though not always by way of incorporation or subjection."
He saw the Great Powers as large, status-seeking political communities naturally
challenging all other possible prestige bearers. On the eve of the First World War,
Weber wrote:
Experience teaches that claims to prestige have always played into the origins of
wars. Their part is difficult to gauge; it cannot be determined in general, but it is
very obvious. The realm of 'honor' which is comparable to the 'status order'
within a political structure, pertains also to the interrelations of political
structures. 128
Rejecting economic determinism, Fukuyama relies on interpretations of
German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) for the
proposition that the "motor of history" is man's desire for recognition, which along
with "the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the
human personality critical to political life." Fukuyama's explanation of the
development of international politics points to what amounts to honour:
125. ALFRED ECKHARD ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918-1935
277 (2d. ed. London 1939).
126. See GAY, supra note 16 at 258; McALEER, supra note 90 at 34-35.
127. KIERNAN, supra note 98 at 316-17.
128. FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 159-161 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans.
& ed., New York, 1958).
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The desire for recognition that led to the original bloody battle for
prestige between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism
and world empire. The relationship of lordship and bondage on a
domestic level is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations
as a whole29 seek recognition and enter into bloody battles for
supremacy. 1
Fukuyama sees the 1914-18 war as a battle for pure prestige. He invokes
Platonic thymos-the soul's spirited element offering courage, fierceness, and
indignation tied to a sense of honour-to dub the war, a classic thymotic
struggle. 130 Joining historians pointing to the mass exhilaration that greeted the
war's outbreak, Fukuyama diagnoses an honour-related syndrome, a megalothymia
(exuberance) of nations seeking "recognition of their worth and dignity" and of
individuals rebelling against the isothymia (boredom) of everyday life. 131 His focus
on thymos coincides with the many references to honour in August 1914.132 This
approach is particularly pertinent to the prestige orientation of both AustriaHungary and Russia, the States most directly responsible for the catastrophe.
"You see in me the last monarch of the old school," said eighty-year-old
Habsburg Emperor Francis Joseph to former U.S. President Roosevelt. 133 Indeed,
honour and duty were central themes in Francis Joseph's increasingly fatalistic
34
understanding of statecraft: 1
The honour of the Monarchy [i.e. Austria-Hungary] still held pride of
place in Franz Joseph's Weltanschauung. And in a sense his policy was
the same after 1866 [Austria's defeat by Prussia] as before--to defend his
position as long as possible, to do his duty, and if that failed, to go down
with honour. But it was nevertheless for the emperor to judge when the
honour of the Monarchy was being openly challenged. After 1866 he was

129. FUKUYAMA, supra note 5 at xvii, xx, 143-152; "poverty with prestige is better than affluent
with disgrace," see HOWARD K. BLOOM, THE LUCIFER PRINCIPLE: A SCIENTIFIC EXPEDITION INTO THE
FORCES OF HISTORY 250-257 (New York 1995).
130. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at xvi-xvii; THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 63 (Francis MacDonald
Cornford, ed., Oxford 1941): "This term [thymosl covers a group of impulses manifested in anger and
pugnacity, in generous indignation allied to a sense of honour and in competitive ambition. Its virtue is
courage."
131. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at 331-332; GAY, supra note 16, at 514-17; EKSTEINS, supra
note 96, at 55-64; ORLANDO FIGEs, A PEOPLE'S TRAGEDY: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1891-1924 25051 (London 1996); JAMES BYSSE JOLL, EUROPE SINCE 1870: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 193-195

(2d. ed. Harmondsworth 1976).
132. See BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 103, 117-18, 124, 132, 138, 140-41 (New
York 1963).
133. Friedrich Engel-Janosi, Der Monarch und seine Ratgeber, in PROBLEME DER FRANZISKOJOSEPHINISCHEN ZEIT 1848-1916 9-24, at 9 (Friedrich Engel-Janosi & Helmuth Rumpler eds., Vienna
1967).
134. Id.; Hugo Hantsch, Kaiser FranzJoseph und die Aufienpolitik, in PROBLEME DER FRANZISKOJOSEPHINISCHEN ZEIT

25-39;

HEINRICH BENEDIKT, DIE MONARCHIE DES HAUSES OSTERREICH: EIN

HISTORISCHES ESSAY 124, 226, 229 (Vienna 1968); ADAM WANDRUSZKA, THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG
147-54 (Cathleen & Hans Epstein trans., New York 1964); I BRIEFE KAISER FRANZ JOSEPHS AN

KAISERIN ELISABETH 1859-1898 28, 32 (Georg Nostitz-Rieneck ed., Vienna 1966).
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simply more long-suffering and more reluctant to go to war than in his
of maintaining the
earlier years. It was not until 1914 that he despaired
3
honour of the Monarchy by diplomatic means.
After Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip killed the Habsburg heir apparent,
retaliation was endorsed by Francis Joseph who knew that resort to arms would
probably trigger a European war that might destroy Austria-Hungary.136 His ancien
regime logic he explained to General Staff Chief Conrad von Htitzendorf: "If the
Monarchy is already doomed, at least it ought to go down honourably
(anstaindig)."'137 The Sarajevo assassination caused Conrad to write in the same
vein: "It will be a hopeless struggle, but nevertheless it must be, because such an
ancient monarchy and such an ancient army cannot perish ingloriously."'' 38 After
Francis Joseph declared war on Serbia, he asked his peoples to make "sacrifices for
the honour, the majesty, the power of the Fatherland." Justifying recourse to force,
he explained: "The machinations of a hostile power, moved by hatred, compel me
after many long years of peace to take up the sword to preserve the honour of my
Monarchy....' 3 9 Similarly, German Emperor William II called on his people to
"stand, in resolute fidelity, by our ally," Austria-Hungary "which is battling for its
power, and with whose humiliation our power and honor, too,
reputation as a great
140
would be lost.'
Prestige was also crucial to Russia, trying to regain standing among the Great
Powers after humiliating defeats in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War and the 190809 Bosnian annexation crisis. "We will not let ourselves be trampled upon," said
Russian Emperor Nicholas II in January 1914 to French Ambassador Th6ophile
Delcass. 14 Upholding national honour drove Russia to support Serbia said
British historian Dominic Lieven:
necessary to grasp the
To understand why Russia went to war in 1914 it is...

135. F.R. BRIDGE, FROM SADOWA TO SARAJEWO: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY,
1866-1914 12 (London 1972).
136. See GEORGE R. MAREK, THE EAGLES DIE: FRANZ JOSEPH, ELISABETH AND THEIR AUSTRIA
441-42, 454-55 (New York 1974). Told Germany would be true even if Austria-Hungary's planned
attack on Serbia triggered "the big war" with France and Russia, Francis Joseph said "Now we can no
longer turn back. It will be a terrible war." See LUIGI ALBERTINI, 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1914
142 (Isabella M. Massey trans., London 1953).

137.

VIKTOR BIBL,
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DER ZERFALL OSTERREICHS: VON REVOLUTION ZU REVOLUTION

498-99

(Vienna 1924); Francis Joseph repeated remarks circling around the words "to do one's duty and--if it
must be--to go down with honour [Ehre], see ENGEL-JANOSI, supra note 133, at 22; DEAK, supra note
98, at 75 ("The final responsibility for what happened... lay with Francis Joseph, who... sensing that
the monarchy was doomed, nevertheless consented to the issuing of an unacceptable ultimatum. He
signed the fatal mobilization order so as to preserve the dignity of the house.").
138. Jun. 28, 1914, see GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG, THE ARMY OF FRANCIS JOSEPH 177 (West
Lafayette, Indiana 1976).
139. Wiener Zeitung, Jul. 29, 1914, see EDWARD CRANKSHAW, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
HABSBURG 404 (New York 1963).
140. Appeal to the German People, Aug. 6, 1914, see GAY, supra note 16 at 515.
141. See FIGES, supra note 131 at 249.
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values and mentality of the Russian ruling dlites, including Nicholas II. In old
regime Europe the nobleman was brought up to defend his public reputation and
honour at all costs, if necessary with sword in hand. The ethic of the duel still
prevailed in aristocratic and, in particular, military circles. No crime was worse
than cowardice. Kings, aristocrats and generals were not used to being pushed
about or humiliated. In contemporary parlance, they had a short fuse.
On war's outbreak, Nicholas II proclaimed that it was imperative "to protect
the honour,
dignity and safety of Russia and its position among the Great
42
Powers." 1

Honour was also targeted by its critics. For example, Norman Angell (18741967) wrote (1910) The GreatIllusion-an anti-war best seller deriding the idea of
national honour and deploring the survival of the code duello, then "maintained as
vigorously as ever in the relations of States."' 143 This critical current flowed in
Parliament on the eve of Britain's entry into the First World War. Labour Party
Leader James Ramsay Macdonald argued:
There has been no crime [i.e. going to war] committed by statesmen of
this character without those statesmen appealing to their nation's honour.
We fought the Crimean War because of our honour. We rushed to South
Africa because of our honour. The right hon. Gentleman [Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Grey] is appealing to us today because of our
honour. 144

Exactly this view was echoed by Independent Labour Party Chairman James
Keir Hardie. 145 Similarly, Liberal MP Sir William Byles said:
It is not a war to defend our hearths and homes. If it were I could understand this
exultation. It is to defend our honour.... It is for honour that a German duellist
fights his fellow officer. Whether he kills his opponent or is killed by him, honour
is revenged. So it is to be now. We are to hire a number of men, a number of
soldiers, to go and blow out the brains of another number of men, to vindicate our
honour. 146

For Liberal MP John Annan Bryce, going to war was "a regular house that
Jack built" because "we have the French joining the Russians on a point of honour
47
and we are joining the French on a point of honour." 1

142. RusSIA, supra note 11, at 5, 7, 20-22, 65-68, 72, 86, 95-96, 100, 108, 111, 114-16, 123, 128,
131-33; see also DOMINIC LIEVEN, NICHOLAS II: TwILIGHT OF THE EMPIRE 174, 190, 200-01 (New
York 1993).
143. ANGELL, supra note 119, at 175-79.
144. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 1830.
145. See id. at 1841.
146. Id.at 1873.
147. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5"h ser.) (1914) at 1876.
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J.Did Honour Require Britainto Fight in 1914?
Prime Minister Asquith told Parliament that Belgium had refused Germany's
August 2nd demand for "free passage through Belgian territory" as a "flagrant
violation of the law of nations,"' 148 a phrase pointing to infringement of Belgian
sovereignty as a contravention of customary international law. This interpretation
coincided with German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg's astonishing
Reichstag admission that Germany's August 4th march into Belgium was an
Unrecht (wrong, tort, delinquency) which "violates the precepts of international
law."1 49 Treaty obligation aside, this customary law contravention was-according
to international law as it was in 1914--merely matter for a bilateral dispute
between Belgium and Germany. As for Britain's becoming a party to the dispute,
her locus standi arose from the invasion's being simultaneously a violation of the
neutrality guaranteed by the 1839 London agreements to which Britain was
party. 5 ° The fact that Britain's casus belli was breach of treaty understandably
provoked discussion about the nature of treaty obligation which was consistently
portrayed not as a matter of law, but of honour.' 5'
The consensus was that treaty obligation arose from a "good faith" promise,
of which fulfilment was a matter of national honour, abandonment a national
disgrace. A distinguished barrister, Asquith justified going to war to uphold the
1839 treaties:
If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the
first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which,
if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary
concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of
law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have
repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle...

148. Id. at 1926.
149. Aug. 4, 1914, see MANN, supra note 114, at 577 ("Unsere Truppen haben Luxemburg besezt,
und vielleicht schon belgisches Gebiet. Das wiederspricht den Geboten des V61kerrechts ....Das
Unrecht, das wir damit tun, werden wir wieder gutmachen, sobald unseres militflrisches Ziel erreicht
ist.").
150. Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia guaranteed Belgium's neutrality in two
1839 treaties with the Netherlands and Belgium respectively, see 88 CTS 411-26; for 1870 and 1908
legal opinions, see 8 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914 371-79 (G. P.
Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., London, 1932).
151. The 1870 neutrality precedent and pacifism in the Liberal Party caused Cabinet to disagree
over aiding France, but the German invasion of Belgium tipped the scales, see PHILLIPSON, supra note
70, at 7-26; Keith M. Wilson, The Cabinet's Decision for War, 1914, in POLICY OF THE ENTENTE:
ESSAYS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1904-1914 135-147 (Keith M. Wilson
ed., Cambridge 1985); TREVOR WILSON, THE MYRIAD FACES: BRITAIN AND THE GREAT WAR 28-35
(Oxford 1986); MICHAEL G. FRY, LLOYD GEORGE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE EDUCATION OF A

1890-1916 183-213 (Montreal-London 1977); Britain would likely have opted for
neutrality and France for an early peace, had Germany held back in the West and attacked Russia
instead. See AJ.P. TAYLOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN EUROPE: 1848-1918 549 n.l (Oxford
1954).
STATESMAN,

2002

HONOUR'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL STATES' SYSTEM

139

that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international
good faith [i.e. pacta sunt
servanda], by the arbitrary will of a strong and
52
overmastering Power.1
Asquith characterized as "infamous," "betrayal" and "dishonour of our
obligations"3 the proposal that Britain acquiesce in Germany's march through
5
Belgium.'
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had studied law at Oxford University. He
recalled the government's commitment that there would be "no secret
engagement" foisting "an obligation of honour upon the country."' 54 A clear
picture of treaty obligation emerges from his description of the Franco-Russian
alliance:
I can say this with the most absolute confidence--no Government and no
country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute between
Austria and Servia than the Government and country of France. They are
involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite
alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that
obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not
parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of
that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and
55 completely cleared the
ground with regard to the question of obligation.1
Although the 1839 London Treaties guarantying Belgium's neutrality were
the crux of debate, a "legal" obligation to help Belgium was not mentioned.
Rather the issue was whether the treaties had engaged Britain's honour-posing
the terrible sanction of dishonour. Grey said: "If in a crisis like this, we run away
from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty... we
should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the
world."' 5 6 This reasoning was supported by Conservative Opposition Leader
Andrew Bonar Law who spoke of "honour and security."'51 7 However, Labour
Party Leader Macdonald asked "whether the country is in danger."
Ignoring
treaties, Macdonald said neutrality alone is "in the deepest parts of our hearts"
consistent with the honour of the country and of the Liberal Party.'58
On August 4, Grey told U.S. Ambassador Page: "England would be forever
contemptible if it should sit by and see this treaty violated. Its position would be
gone if Germany were thus permitted to dominate Europe."' 5 9 Grey's memoirs
repeated the theme of dishonour: "The real reason for going into the war was that,

152. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 2079.

153. Id. at 2076-77.
154. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 1810.

155. Id. at 1814-15.
156. Id.at 1823-25.
157. Id. at 1828.
158. Id. at 1830-31.
159. 1 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WALTER H. PAGE 314 (Burton J. Hendrick, ed., Doubleday,
Page & Co. 1922).
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if we did not.., stand up for Belgium against this aggression, we should be
isolated, discredited, and hated; and there would be before us nothing but a
miserable and ignoble future. ' '16
Similarly, Britain's Ambassador in Berlin pointed to honour to explain why
England was willing to fight for the 1839 treaties:
In the same way, as he [Bethmann Hollweg] and [Foreign Minister] Herr
[Gottlieb] von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a
matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate her
neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn
engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That
could anyone have in
solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence
161
engagements given by Great Britain in the future?
The link between treaty performance and honour was not just an dlite
perception, but widespread among that generation of Englishmen.162 London
University Professor of French History, Alfred Cobban (1901-1968) said: "In 1914
there was still a general expectation that treaties would be kept until they were
formally denounced. It is difficult to think back now to a time when the German
disregard of Belgian neutrality was regarded as a shattering blow to normal
conventions of international behaviour." 63 Poet Rupert Brooke (1887-1915) then
thought Belgium "a thousand times enough" to fight for, and poet and writer
Robert Graves (1895-1985) later recalled having been "outraged to read of the
cynical violation of Belgian neutrality."' 64 Streaming to the colours, recruits
believed they were doing the right thing: "Few young English officers doubted that
Germany had broken the code of European nations and deserved to be
punished."' 165 This violation of the 1839 treaties was condemned by British public
religious
opinion as a dishonourable breach of faith-a transgression helping
166
denominations portray the Allied cause as a 20th century crusade.

160. VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON, 2 TWENTY-FivE YEARS 1892-1916 15-16, 322-24 (The
Ryerson Press 1925).
161. Letter from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Berlin, Nos. 667 and 671, Aug. 4 and 6,
1914, 9 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914 347, 352 (London 1926); The
DIARY OF EDWARD GOSCHEN 1900-1914 50 (Royal Historical Society, 25 Camden, 4th ser.,
Christopher H.D. Howard ed., London 1980).
162. See Michael Howard, Europe on the Eve of the First World War, in THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
119-20 (New Haven-London 1991).
163. ALFRED COBBAN, 3 A HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE 106 (Baltimore 1965).
164. Sep. 24, 1914, THE LETrERS OF RUPERT BROOKE 618 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., London 1968);
ROBERT GRAVES, GOODBYE TO ALL THAT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 99 (London 1929).
165. ROBERT WOHL, THE GENERATION OF 1914 93 (Harvard Univ. Press 1979).

166. See Lillian M. Penson, Obligations by Treaty: Their Place in British Foreign Policy, 18981914, in STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN HONOUR OF G.P. GOOCH 87
(Arshag Ohan Sarkissian ed., London 1961); ALBERT MARRIN, THE LAST CRUSADE: THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 131-32, 221, 251 (Durham N.C., 1974); HUBERT GEBELE, DIE
PROBLEME VOM KRIEG UND FRIEDEN IN GROBBRITANNIEN WAHREND DES ERSTEN WELTKRIEGS:
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K. Was "National Honour" Recognized by InternationalLaw?
Although our ownfin de sicle finds appeals to honour pompous, affected and
even ridiculous, pre-1914 juridical discourse abounds with sincere references to
"honour" in speeches, diplomatic papers, private correspondence, books and
treaties. Such language was not merely rhetorical because customary international
law then recognized that a country had a "right to reputation," i.e. respect for its
moral and juristic personality, including "the right to demand satisfaction for an
offence against its honour."'' 67 Scottish advocate and Glasgow judge, James
Reddie (1773-1852) included among a nation's general permanent attributes its
"national honour" or "reputation" defined as:
the right of a nation to the maintenance of its honour, character, and reputation-a
right which is so difficult to define in the abstract; but which, in the concrete, and
in the particular case, is so easily understood and felt, and the maintenance of
which is so conducive to the security and prosperity of a nation.168
This "right to respect" was also described by Alphonse Pierre Octave Rivier
(1835-1898) who was a Swiss diplomat and Professor of International Law at
Brussels University: "The State's moral character, dignity, honour, credit, and
good reputation are as much elements of its personality as its physical, economic
and juridical condition. The State has the right to keep them intact against any
slur."' 169 Similarly, the British editor of the Commentary of U.S. jurist James Kent
(1763-1847) identified as the primary objects of international law, "the
independence of nations, the inviolability of their several territories, and the
maintenance of their honour."' 170 This kind of thinking helped 19th century States
justify using force to defend their honour. For example, national dignity was
offended by Venezuelan President de Castro's 1908 dismissal of Dutch Minister
Resident de Reuss. In reprisal, Dutch cruisers
captured two Venezuelan public
7
ships which were held pending apology.' '
Just as the aristocrat refused "to remit to the courts the settlement of his
affairs of honour," so national honour was generally regarded as a matter of
paramount concern beyond the bounds of arbitration.1 72 According to Argentine
international lawyer, diplomat and historian Carlos Calvo (1824-1906):

REGIERUNG, PARTEIEN UND OFFENTLICHE MEINUNG IN DER AUSEINANDERSETZUNG OBER KRIEGS-

UND FRIEDENSZIELE 46 (Frankfurt 1987).

167.

JOHANN KASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL CODIFICADO

bk. I1,§ 85 at 95

(Jos6 Diaz Covarrubias trans. Mexico City, 1871).

168. JAMES REDDIE, INQUIRIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 198 (2d. ed.
Edinburgh 1851).
169. ALPHONSE RIVIER, I PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS 260 (Paris 1896).
170. See KENT, COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 3.
171. See LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 34 at 40 and § 37 at 43
(2d. ed. London 1912).
172. See Honor andSocial Status, supra note 4, at 30-3 1; KIERNAN, supra note 98, at 316: "What
the duel had been for gentlemen... war was now for rulers who were infecting their peoples with the
belief that it would be shameful to surrender 'national honour' to international laws or courts."
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"Arbitration can settle every species of difference except those in which honor and
national dignity are directly in play and which arise from a personal sentiment
which no third state can properly judge, each nation being the sole judge of its
dignity and the rights which guarantee its safety."' 173 The International Law
Association's 1893 arbitration plan accordingly distinguished arbitrable disputes
from those involving national honour and independence.1 74 In 1896, British Prime
Minister Lord Salisbury weighed the possibility of "establishing a system of
international arbitration for the adjustment of disputes" with the United States.
Sending to Washington the outline of a stillborn arbitration treaty, Salisbury noted:
"Neither Government is willing to accept arbitration upon issues in which the
national honour or integrity is involved."'' 75 Hardly surprising, therefore, was the
inclusion in the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of a provision limiting fact-finding commissions to "disputes of an
international character involving neither honour nor vital interests."' 176 Referring to
the new Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, Britain and France made
(1903) an agreement excluding from compulsory arbitration, differences affecting
"the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the two Contracting
States."' 177 Although the Anglo-French treaty was hardly the first to exclude
disputes affecting national honour, 78 the tripartite exception--or variations
thereof-was replicated in subsequent British and French treaties with other
countries, and adopted by the United States and other States for many of the
bilateral arbitration conventions signed before the First World War. 79
L. Was DishonourInternationalLaw's Sanction?
Lincoln's Inn barrister Mountague Bernard (1820-1882) was Professor of
173. CHARLES CALVO, 3 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL § 1756 (5th ed., Paris 1896); See JACKSON H.
RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO § 21 at 32 (Palo Alto-London
1929).
174. See HINSLEY, supra note 81, at 138.
175. Doc. No. 12, Letter from Lord Salisbury to British Ambassador at Washington, Mar. 5, 1896,
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE LAID BEFORE THE

CONFERENCE BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT 94 (Oxford 1921).

176. Art. 9, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Jul. 29, 1899, in 187
CTS 415. The Article 9 "honour" exception originated with Russia, see 1 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 306
(James Brown Scott ed. New York 1916) [hereinafter HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES].

177. Art. 1, Agreement between France and Great Britain for the Settlement by Arbitration of
Certain Classes of Questions which may arise between the two Governments, Oct. 14, 1903, in 194
CTS 194-95.

178. For example, disputes affecting "either the national honour or the national independence" are
excluded by Article I of the Arbitration Treaty between Mexico and Spain, Jan. 11, 1902, in 190 CTS
334.
179. Re this self-judging "honour" clause, see I HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 176 at
78 and 329; HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 7, 77; for the formula applied, see Article 1,
Arbitration Convention between France and Italy, Dec. 25, 1903, in 194 CTS 365; and 206 CTS,
Article I of U.S. treaties with Mexico (288-289), Italy (354), Britain (360), Norway (363-364), Portugal
(368-369), and Spain (418-419).
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International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford University. From the perspective of
19th century international law, he opined: "Honour-which in its higher sense
means self-respect, in its lower sense respect for the opinion of a particular
class-may and does help to supply, among nations as among individuals, the
absence of those sanctions which wait upon municipal law."' 180 Similarly, Yale
University President Theodore Dwight Woolsey (1801-1889) included among
international law's sanctions each State's "moral sentiment" as "a considerable and
an increasing force... which comes into the recesses of palaces and cabinets; and
which sometimes speaks in threatening tones against gross wrongs."' 8' He
believed that a whole country's population could feel the sting of a national insult,
and sense "the loss of a good name upon intercourse with other states, as well upon
that self-respect which is an important element in national character.... Without
such a value set on reputation, fear of censure could not exist, which is one of the
ultimate bulwarks of international law."' 182 Sounding a more positive note, Swiss
jurist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808-1881) argued: "Any State--even the most
powerful--will appreciably gain in honour before God and man, if it is found
to be
83
loyal and sincere in its respect for and compliance with the law of nations."1
In 1908, U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root told the American Society of
International Law that the conduct of States was judged by "the general opinion of
the world" and that governments "dread the moral isolation created by general
adverse opinion and unfriendly feeling."
This, the principal sanction of
international law, he described through comparisons with his own domestic
society, which from today's perspective appears astonishingly preoccupied with
propriety and honour-in Root's words, "social esteem and standing, power and
high place." To deter against anti-social behaviour, he downplayed the role of
"sheriff and policeman" and highlighted reputation as "nearly everything for which
men strive in life." So, in international relations, Root deprecated the sanction of
war and focused on "the power of international opinion." In essence, he believed
that States are subject to "recognized rules of right conduct," violation of which
results in discredit and debilitating ostracism--"a nation which 8 rests
under the
4
world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power."1
M The Rise of the Legal Paradigm
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently remarked: "World
War I started not because countries broke their treaties, but because they fulfilled
them to the letter." His critique is that "every country was concerned above all

180. MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, FOUR LECTURES ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH DIPLOMACY

(London 1868) LECTURE IV: THE OBLIGATION OF TREATIES, at 200.
181. THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §

228, at 407 (6th ed., London 1888).
182. Id. at § 18 at 17; see also §§ 81-82 at123-25.
183. Bluntschli to Moltke, Heidelberg, Christmas 1880, in REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 96 at 84 ("Les lois de la guerre sur terre.").
184. Elihu Root, The Sanction of InternationalLaw, in 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 451-57 (1908).
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with living up to formal treaty obligations rather than to an overall concept of longrange common interest."' 85 However, the 1914-18 generation's assessment was
entirely opposite. Contemporaries were certain that failure to observe treaty
obligations-or rather the absence of international machinery to compel treaty
performance-had been the States' system's cardinal defect. 186 They saw this as
the lacuna that enabled Bethmann Hollweg to say
1 "scrap of paper" for the 1839
London Treaty guarantying Belgium's neutrality. 17
In repudiating the discredited honour-based diplomacy of kings, the 1914-18
generation had nowhere to turn but to a legal paradigm. This was a natural reflex
because of the fundamental polarity between cultures of honour and legality.188 No
longer willing to perpetuate the ancien regime, the middle class reached for the
nearby analogies of domestic law-a realm entirely comfortable because the
centuries-old legal profession had always had a bourgeois ethos. 8 9 This
borrowing was specifically advocated by France's Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau. He expressed solidarity "with President Wilson who, by establishing
the foundations of the League of Nations, has had the honor of transferring the
essential principles of national law into international law."' 190 Lawyers-including
Wilson, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Italian Prime Minister
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando-were prominent among the League's founding
fathers and a "legal, or rather legalistic, conception of international conflict" was
embodied in the Covenant.' 9'

185. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 211 (Simon & Schuster 1994); for the alliance system's
ossification, see Klaus Hildebrand, The Crisis of 1914, in GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM BISMARCK
TO ADENAUER 90-93 (Louise Willmot trans., London 1989); Charles S. Maier, Wargames: 1914-1919,
in THE ORIGIN AND PREVENTION OF MAJOR WARS 254 (Robert I. Rotberg & Theodore K. Rabb eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) ("It ...was not the binding nature of the alliances, but the possibility for
defection, that proved more destabilizing. Vienna and St. Petersburg sought reassurances beyond the
letter of the texts, needed demonstrative state visits, and pursued pledges of support--and, in 1914,
extracted them because Paris and Berlin feared that they would seem indifferent.").
186. See TAYLOR, supra note 151, at 535-37. For adding international sanctions to the States'

system,

see HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY AND WORLD ORDER PROPOSALS

79-93

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
187. Bethmann Hollweg said "Just for a word 'neutrality' a word which in wartime had so often
been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation
which desired nothing better than to be friends with her." See No. 671, Letter from Sir Edward Goschen
to Sir Edward Grey, Berlin, Aug. 6, 1914, 11 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 351,
supra note 122; DIARY OF EDWARD GOSCHEN, APPENDIX B: 'A SCRAP OF PAPER', supra note 161, at
298-302.
188. See Honourand Social Status, supra note 4, at 30-31, 510; BERNHARDI, supra note 122, at 2428; McAleer, supra note 90, at 30; GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS, supra note 3, at 117-38; DEAK, supra
note 98, at 128-38.
189. The "non-clerical literate profession" dated from the 13th century, see J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 133-50 (2d. ed. London, 1979).
190. 1 THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF FOUR (MAR. 24-JUN. 28, 1919): NOTES OF THE
OFFICIAL INTERPRETER PAUL MANTOUX, MEETING XXV 193 (Arthur S. Link trans. & ed. Princeton,
1992).
191. F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES 1920-1946 58-59 (Leicester,
1986).

2002

HONOUR'S ROLE [N THE INTERNATIONAL STATES' SYSTEM

Despite, or because of, Britain's complex global position, the Foreign Office
assumed "diplomacy could solve most problems that arose in world affairs."', 92 In
this context, pre-1914 British diplomacy was exceptionally committed to the
principle of dispute settlement via arbitration. Viewing international relations as
"consciously ruled by law," the Foreign Office had a marked "respect
for
legality."' 193 This characteristically British attitude, as ultimately expressed in the
League of Nations as a war aim, reminded Cambridge University historian Herbert
Butterfield (1900-1979) of the declining Habsburg Monarchy in the age of
Metternich.' 94 The meaning of this unflattering comparison is elucidated by
Kissinger's reflection: "Because law is the expression of the status quo, Austria
stood for... the necessity of law and the sanctity of treaties."'' 9 5 Such a realist
critique sees peace treaties, like those of 1815 and 1919, as the codification of the
outcome of the last hegemonic war, when the paramount power won legitimacy for
its right to rule. 1 96 This observation by Princeton University's Robert Gilpin is
useful alongside A.J.P. Taylor's remark that the ideological exigencies of the First
World War gradually drove the Entente Powers, "rather against their will, to the
doctrine of an international order, based upon law instead of upon force." Fighting
for survival as a Great Power, Britain in particular moved ever closer to the
97
doctrine of "the rule of law" as a response to Germany's astonishing strength. 1
N. Was the United States Cooler to the Legal Paradigm?
Kissinger says the premise that the States' system should be governed by
international law is a deep-rooted U.S. idea tied to the belief that the same ethical
principles should regulate relations between countries and between individuals.' 9"
However, official Washington was slower than London to abandon the rhetoric of
honour for that of law. This reluctance is explained by several considerations.
First, expanding the rule of law in international affairs was less urgent for the
United States as a rising power than for Britain in decline. 199 Second, the Wilson
administration came later to detailed thinking about war aims because the United
192. KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 231.
193. Clive Parry, Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, in BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SIR
EDWARD GREY 109-110 (F. H. Hinsley ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977).
194. For the League of Nations as a Mettemichian "attempt to freeze the status quo," see HERBERT
BUTTERFIELD, CHRISTIANITY, DIPLOMACY AND WAR 115-116 (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press 1953).
195. HENRY A. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED: THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATISM IN A
REVOLUTIONARY Age 7 (Grosset & Dunlap 1964).
196. See GILPIN, supra note 9, at 34; BERNHARDI, supra note 122, at 25-27.
197. See TAYLOR, supra note 151, at 535-537; KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 209-215, 231;
EKSTEINS, supra note 96, at xv ("Britain was, in fact, the major conservative power of the fin-de-sicle
world. First industrial nation, agent of the Pax Britannica, symbol of an ethic of enterprise and progress
based on parliament and law, Britain felt not only her pre-eminence in the world but her entire way of
life threatened by the thrusting energy and instability Germany was seen to typify.").
198. See KiSSINGER, supra note 185, at 18, 20, 22, 30, 32-34, 45-46, 52-53, 55, 161, 222-28, 234,
247,415, 427,438,477,544.
199. For the United States' geopolitical position, see, KISSINGER, supra note 185, at 18, 20, 30-39;
on Britain's decline, see id. at 38; GILPIN, supra note 9, at 194-97; KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 224-32;
WILSON, supra note 151, at 70-74.
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States was neutral until April 1917. Third, the Senate's constitutional role in treaty
making taught presidents that firm commitments are less easily ratified than
20 0
undertakings with broad exceptions, such as those referring to national honour.
Wilson himself was certain the Senate would reject any treaty committing the
United States to go to war pursuant to a decision by other countries or an
international body. 20 1 Finally, Wilson-perhaps due to his sad experience as an
Atlanta lawyer-was antipathetic to the practising profession and quick to reject
legalism. 20 2 He said lawyers "as a rule immediately tie their hands or powers up in
technical legal limitations. 20 3 He told the American Commission to Negotiate
Peace: "I don't want lawyers drafting this treaty." 2°
Wilson's ambivalent attitude to law must also be seen in the light of U.S.
politics. On the one side was the focus on democracy and social justice of U.S.
"progressive internationalists" like Wilson who was a Democrat; on the other side,
the legalism of "conservative internationalists" like Elihu Root and ex-President
William Howard Taft who were Republicans.20 5 Believing law to be just one of
the tools for upholding morality and realizing human progress, Wilson still
"preferred to rely upon 'diplomatic adjustment' rather than 'strict legal justice' in
resolving international disputes., 20 6 Thus, his idea for a League of Nations focused
less on devising foolproof machinery for dispute settlement and collective security
and more on opening a permanent political forum for the expression and
coordination of world public opinior--the key Wilsonian concept. 20 7 His plans
were therefore developed with non-lawyer Colonel Edward Mandell House, rather
than with Secretary of State Robert Lansing, an international lawyer whose

200. Wilson described the Senate's "treaty-marringpower" in Congressional Government (1885),
reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 38-39, 130-131 (Arthur S. Link ed., Princeton
1966-1994), [hereinafter PWWI; for the Senate's role, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS
NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
201. Letter from Wilson to Edward Mandell House, Mar. 22, 1918, 47 PWW 105, supra note 200;
William H. Taft re: Mar. 28, 1918 meeting with Wilson, id. at 200-201; for Wilson's strenuous efforts
to portray the League Covenant as a "moral, not a legal, obligation," see Conversation with Members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conference at the White House, Aug. 19, 1919, 62 PWW 343,
350-35 1, supranote 200.
202. MICHAEL DUNNE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1935 21 (St. Martin's

Press 1988); for Wilson's legal practice, see ARTHUR WALWORTH, I WOODROW WILSON 23, 34-36 (3d.
ed. WW Norton & Co. 1978); AUGUST HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON 58-59 (Maxwell Macmillan
International 1991); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & JULIETrE L. GEORGE, WOODROW WILSON AND
COLONEL HOUSE: A PERSONALITY STUDY 18-20 (2d. ed., Dover Publications 1964).
203. Wilson's late 1916 words to lawyer Samuel Thompson, in latter's Jan. 15, 1917 letter asking
for Federal Trade Commission appointment, see 40 PWW 490, supra note 200.
204. Jan. 8, 1919, quoted by U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing. See 54 PWW 4, supra note
200.
205. THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW
WORLD ORDER 49-69, 267-268 (Princeton Univ. Press 1992).
206. DUNNE, supra note 202, at 21.

207. Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conference at the
White House, Aug.19, 1919, 62 PWW 363, 372, 388-89, supranote 200.
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"legalistic opinions" were distasteful to Wilson.2 °5
Although Wilson's speeches frequently referred to international law, he never
abandoned the discourse of honour. For example, in May 1916 Wilson talked
about a "new and more wholesome diplomacy" resting on "the same high code of
honour that we demand of individuals." 2 9 His April 1917 war message to
Congress twice referred to the future world organization as a "League of
Honour., 210 Honour also featured in his July 10, 1919 explanation of the League
Covenant: "There is no provision for military action except upon advice of the
[League] Council, advice given to the several governments. Of course it follows
that the several governments will take that advice or not, as they please, and it will
be a matter of honor with them whether they will or not. There is no legal
obligation." 21' However, Wilson's yardstick for measuring national honour was
democratic public opinion rather than the ancien rigime's aristocratic values.
0. Was Honour No Longer Sufficient?
As early as August 1915, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Colonel House about a
"League of Nations that could be relied on to insist that disputes between any two
nations must be settled by arbitration, mediation, or conference of others." Grey
said: "International Law has hitherto had no sanction. The lesson of this war is that
the powers must bind themselves to give it a sanction. 212 A month later, he asked
House: "Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations
binding themselves to side against any power which broke a treaty... or which
refused,
in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of
,2 13
,

war?

Grey's successor as Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour asked: "If
existing Treaties are no more than scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us?"
Relaying to Washington, British principles for peace, Balfour in January 1917
portrayed the pre-war "community of nations" as "plentifully supplied indeed with
international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them." His three
conditions for a durable peace included ensuring treaty compliance: "Behind
International law and behind all Treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting
hostilities some form of International sanction should be devised which would give

208. ARTHUR WALWORTH, WILSON AND HIS PEACEMAKERS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT THE
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919 8 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1986).

209. Address to League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, 37 PWW 113, supranote 200; the League
of Nations was then seen by U.S. "progressive internationalists" like Wilson as arising from stalemate
and mediation, but by Sir Edward Grey and U.S. "conservative internationalists" as a war aim realizable
via Entente victory, see KNOCK, supra note 205, at 57-58; DAVID FRENCH, BRITISH STRATEGY AND
WAR AIMS 1914-1916 190-91 (Allen & Unwin 1986).
210. Address to Joint Session of Congress, Apr. 2, 1917, 41 PWW 524, supra note 200.
211. THE COMPLETE PRESS CONFERENCES 1913-1919 (Robert C. Hildebrand ed., Princeton 1985);
50 PWW 790, supra note 200.
212. Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House, London, Aug. 10, 1915, in 2 THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF
COLONEL HOUSE 87-88 (Charles Seymour ed., Boston-New York 1926).
213. Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House, supra note 212, at 89.
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pause to the hardiest aggressor. ' , 2 14 Re-establishing "the sanctity of treaties" was
also the first of Lloyd George's three conditions for "a just and lasting peace" in
his war aims speech to the Trades Union Congress on January 5, 1918.215
The contrast between the U.S. focus on honour and the British fixation on law
became explicit in June 1918. Sharing plans for a League of Nations, House
copied to Wilson a letter written to Lord Robert Cecil, then British Minister of
Blockade. With respect to treaty obligation, House's plan stayed within pre-war
thinking by relying on dishonour as the sanction for breach of treaty:
One of the most essential features of any league seems to me to be the installation
of a moral standard such as that maintained among individuals of honor. Even
before Germany smashed the international fabric, reprehensible conduct was
condoned under the broad cover of patriotism; actions which in individuals would
have been universally condemned and the perpetrators ostracised from society. I
believe that the most vital element in bringing about a world-wide reign of peace
is to have the same stigma rest upon the acts of nations as upon the acts of
individuals. When the people of a country are held up to the scorn and
condemnation of the world because of the dishonorable acts of their
representatives, they will no longer tolerate such acts. To bring this about will not
I think be so difficult as it would seem, and when this condition is realized, a
its treaty obligations with the same fidelity
nation may be counted upon to guard
216
as an individual guards his honor.
Now Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with special
responsibility for planning a League of Nations, Cecil took issue with House's
emphasis on honour:
I notice that you propose that the components of the league should make a
profession of faith to the effect that they will abide by a code of honour. I think it
would be all to the good to have such a profession included in the instrument by
which the league of peace was constructed, but I am afraid I do not think that by
2 17
The example of Germany in this war shows that
itself it could be relied upon.
under the pressure of false teaching and national danger there is no crime which a
civilized nation will not commit, and the same has been found true over and over
again in history. I am convinced that unless some form of coercion can be devised
which will work more or less automatically no league of peace will endure. You
refer to the history of the civilization of individuals; but surely the great

214. Jan. 16, 1917, British Ambassador Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice gave U.S. Secretary of State
Robert Lansing a message which Balfour had written (Jan.13) to Rice, see 40 PWW 499-503, supra
note 200.
215. Cabled to Woodrow Wilson on Jan. 5, 1918, see 45 PWW 486, supra note 200.
216. Edward Mandell House to Lord Robert Cecil, Magnolia, Massachusetts, Jun. 25, 1918, 48
PWW 424-26, supra note 200; honour also features prominently in "Suggestion for a Covenant of a
League of Nations" sent by House to Wilson on Jul. 16, 1918, see id. at 630-637; NORTHEDGE, supra
note 191, at 31-33.
217. An echo of House's draft survived in the reference to "open, just and honourable relations
between nations" in Preamble, Covenant of the League of Nations, Part 1, Treaty of Peace between
Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers, Jun. 28, 1919, in 225 CTS 195-205.
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instrument of law and order has been the establishment of the doctrine of the
supremacy of law. So long as codes of law were only, or mainly codes of honour
or good conduct they were always disobeyed by anyone who was sufficiently
powerful to do so.-8

P. Honour Replaced by Law in 1919
As a fading theme, discourse about "honour" survived the Paris Peace
Conference. For example, France's honour was said to have been at stake in the
June 1940 discussion about whether to abandon Great Britain and make a separate
peace with Germany. 219 But, after 1919-20 "honour" was largely vestigial,

because-as told to the German delegation at the Paris Peace Conference-"the
old era is to be left behind and nations as well as individuals are to be brought
beneath the reign of law., 220 The Covenant of the League of Nations became part
of each one of the 1919-20 peace treaties, which as a body established a new
international order abandoning the old chivalric archetype for the paradigm of
domestic law. Domestic legal systems were the model for the Covenant's four
interrelated innovations: "international peace and security"; a duty to seek peaceful
settlement of international disputes; efforts to make treaties legally binding; and
restraints on recourse to war.
First, Covenant provisions went a long way toward abrogating "privity of
conflict"-i.e. the customary rule that a non-belligerent third party had no right to
interfere (locus standi) in a bilateral international dispute. 22' This was replaced by
an entirely new juridical concept called "international peace and security"-a
communitarian idea which insisted that "any war or threat of war, whether
immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared
a matter of concern to the whole League. 222 The "peace of Europe" and the
"general peace" had featured in earlier treaties.223 However, past references to
"peace" pointed principally to the literal absence of war, in connection with the
legal states of war and peace, then recognized by both international and domestic
law.224 By contrast, the Covenant envisaged "international peace" both literally as

218. Lord Robert Cecil to Edward Mandell House, London, Jul. 22, 1918, 49 PWW 226, supra
note 200.
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FRANCE IN 1940 829, 831 (Simon and Schuster 1969).
220. Letter to the President of the German Delegation covering the Reply of the Allied and
Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, Jun. 16,
1919, 112 BRITISH FOREIGN AND STATE PAPERS 248.
221. Elihu Root to Edward Mandell House, Clinton, New York, August 16, 1918, 49 PWW 269,
supra note 200, read by President Wilson on Aug. 18, 1918.
222. See Article 11, Covenant of the League of Nations.
223. For "the general Peace of Europe," see Preamble, Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia,
Jan. 16, 1756, in 40 CTS 293, and Preamble, Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia, Apr. 11, 1758,
in 41 CTS 18; "the General peace," Art. 1, Treaty of Alliance between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia
and Russia, Mar. 25, 1815, in 64 CTS 32; "the maintenance of the general peace," Preamble and Title I,
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Jul. 29, 1899, in 187 CTS 410-11.
224. Helmut Rumpf, The Concepts of Peace and War in International Law, in 27 GERMAN
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the absence of violence and figuratively as the name for the League of Nations'
new jurisdiction, consciously modeled on the "King's peace" of the early English
Common Law.225
Second, the Covenant placed strong emphasis on seeking peaceful settlement
of international disputes. There was to be the possibility of political settlement by
the League Council and Assembly, and of resolution of justiciable disputes by
binding third-party arbitration, including determinations by a new Permanent Court
of International Justice, which began operating in 1922.26 During the first decade
of its existence, this Court did important work which sustained an "element of
idealism about the role of third party dispute settlement processes. ,,22'
Third, efforts to make treaties legally binding were encouraged by the
memory that Germany's 1914 invasion of Belgium had been a treaty
violation-for Great Britain the casus belli. Although former German Emperor
William II ultimately succeeded in staying in exile in Holland, the Versailles
Treaty created an important precedent by demanding that he personally stand trial
"for a supreme offence against the sanctity of treaties."228 Moreover, the Covenant
called for "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations." Because President
Wilson wanted foreign relations democratized and subject to popular control, his
Fourteen Points decreed that diplomacy "must proceed always frankly and in the
public view." The treaties ending the war were to be "open covenants of peace,
openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings
of any kind. 22 9 Implementation was via the Covenant stipulation that no treaty
was to be "binding" unless registered with the Secretariat which had to publish a
comprehensive League of Nations Treaty Series. 30 Wilson argued that this "open
diplomacy" would enable citizens to follow foreign affairs and monitor State
compliance with international law.2 3 ' Moreover, the 1920 Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice broke new ground by giving the treaty primacy
among the sources of international law-before custom, general principles of law,
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judicial decisions, and the teachings of publicists. 23 2 As an international legal
device, the treaty had clearly risen since 1914, when Bethmann Hollweg had made
his disparaging remark about a "scrap of paper."
Fourth, the League sought to place some international disciplines on a State's
right to wage war, recourse to which had been largely unregulated by the
international law of 1914.233 The strong condemnation of Germany's "criminal"
behaviour was largely ex postfacto-more the cause of international law than its
result. 234 Launching the First World War was by 1919 retroactively judged to have
been a criminal act because of a visceral conviction rooted in the superadded
horrors of 20th century war: "In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers, the
war which began on August 1, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity and
the freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilised, has ever consciously
committed.", 235 The Allies "regard this war as a crime deliberately plotted against
the life and liberties of the peoples of Europe. 236 King George V wrote about his
cousin William II: "I look upon him as the greatest criminal known for having
plunged the world into this ghastly war" and, in conversation with President
Wilson, the King referred to "that unspeakable Kaiser whose crimes have
scandalized the entire world. 237 Elihu Root said the Habsburg and Hohenzollern
rulers were "unrepentant professional criminals"; Supreme Allied Commander
Ferdinand Foch looked on the German military as "an army of scientific and
convinced hooligans"; and Wilson thought Germany an "outlaw nation."238
In a letter underlined by Wilson, Root specifically pointed to domestic
criminal law as the source for the new international order:
If I make a contract with you and you break it, it is no business of our neighbour.
You can sue me or submit, and he has nothing to say about it. On the other hand,
if I assault and batter you, every neighbour has an interest in having me arrested
and punished, because his own safety requires that violence shall be restrained. At
the basis of every community, lies the idea of organization to preserve the peace.
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Without that idea really2 3active
and controlling there can be no community of
9
individuals or of nations.

In this vein, the Covenant established machinery to help League Members
deal with wars of aggression. Moreover, State responsibility for the commission of
an offence was written into the leading article on "reparation" in the treaty with
each one of the defeated Central Powers. Germany, Austria, and Hungary were
compelled to "accept" that their "aggression" had "imposed" the war on the
Allies.2 40 Bulgaria and Turkey were made to recognize that they had joined a "war
of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and
Associated Powers.",2 41
The 1919-20 peace treaties thus began modem
international law's progressive stigmatization of the "war of aggression" which
was ultimately criminalized by the 1945 Charter of the Nuremberg International
Military 2Tribunal, which instituted individual responsibility for "crimes against
24
peace."

Q. League ofNations'

Discourseon Hitler's "SportsPalace" Diplomacy

The United Nations International Law Commission in the 1960s used
SportpalastDiplomatie for German Chancellor Adolf Hitler's "repeated, flagrant,
and at times violent instances of deliberate breaches of treaty, not as a matter of
minor administrative failing or of unanticipated judicial pronouncement, but as a
matter of major politics conducted at the highest level and publicized through the
mass media., 2 43 As foreshadowed in his 1925 book Mein Kampf, Hitler sought to
break free of "the chains of the Versailles Treaty" and destroy the European order
erected at the Paris Peace Conference.2 4 4 Calculated acts toward this end were his
March 16, 1935 decree establishing universal military service to create a 550,000
man German army, and the March 7, 1936 German military occupation of the
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Foreign Secretary Lord Grey in a February 14, 1929 interview opined, "It was a very bad mistake to
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Rhineland-both measures violating the Versailles Treaty; the latter also contrary
to the 1925 Locarno Pact. 245 "Restoring the German people's honour" was Hitler's
oft-repeated theme for domestic consumption. 246 However, there was no honourbased argument in the very extensive League discussions about Germany's treaty
violations. In this League context, there were two tangential references to
"honour," both referring to the Rhineland. First, Hitler's favourite foreign policy
expert, Joachim von Ribbentrop justified the occupation before the Council with
long "legal and practical political" arguments.
However, he celebrated the
"restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich over its whole territory," saying, "a
heavy moral and political burden has been removed from the German people,
which now at last. . . sees itself re-established in honour and freedom. 247 A sour
note on honour, by contrast, sounded from France's Prime Minister Ldon Blum
who assured the Assembly: "We have attacked the spirit of war, by which I mean
those age-old conceptions
of policy, morality and collective honour which were the
248

justification of war."

Reacting to Germany's unilateral denunciation of the arms limitation
provisions of the Versailles Treaty, diplomats said nothing to the Council about
"honour" or "dishonour." Instead, they portrayed Germany's glaring treaty breach
as a legal violation within the context of the League system. For example,
France's Foreign Minister Pierre Laval said: "The peoples of the world know that
respect for plighted faith... is not only a moral principle but is the living law of
the League of Nations., 2 49 He affirmed France's devotion to the League which he
recognized as "the highest international authority" which has "declared that no
country can repudiate its international undertakings.
and has envisaged
a more
250
effective repression of such infractions of international law in the future."
Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Edvard Beneg said: "All organised and
civilised human society must be based on that most fundamental principle of
international law: pacta sunt servanda. Without this principle, the League of
Nations would cease to have any meaning, any foundations, or any possibility of
working normally."' 25' After echoing these sentiments, Soviet Foreign Minister
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Maxim Litvinov compared the international community to a town, and countries to
individual townsmen:
Let us suppose that in a certain town private citizens are allowed to carry arms.
Theoretically this right should be extended to all the inhabitants of such a town.
Should, however, any citizen publicly threaten his fellow-townsmen.., the
municipality is scarcely likely to hasten to issue to such a citizen a licence to carry
firearms, or quietly to tolerate his furnishing himself with such arms by illegal
means. 252
Using the same metaphor, Spain's Ambassador Salvador de Madariaga added:
"The important thing when a man in the street carries a revolver is not to know
what is its caliber or even if he has other weapons in his pocket, but to know
whether he is a policeman or a criminal." He believed that each country should
have "equality in the right to possess armaments" but also "in the duty of utilising
253
them in a legal, a juridical manner within the framework of a civilised society.,
Reacting to Germany's unilateral remilitarization of the Rhineland, French
Foreign Minister Pierre-ttienne Flandin pleaded violations of the Versailles and
Locarno treaties and told the Council that "the law should be applied., 25 4 He
argued that "under international law, no one has the right to take the law into his
own hands" and offered to have the dispute "settled by the highest international
court--namely, the Permanent Court of International Justice, which is placed
under the highest authority of the League of Nations., 255 In the same vein, Prime
Minister Blum told the Assembly: "Two breaches of international law have been
committed--the breach of the Covenant and the breach of a solemn Treaty. Both
have resulted in a defacto situation that is contrary to law. 256 A similar juridical
vein marked British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's address to the Council:
A patent and incontestable breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
relating to the demilitarised zone has been committed. [... ] The question before
us does not concern a few Powers only. It is of concern to all who value
25 7 the
sanctity of treaty undertakings and the reign of law in international affairs.
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CONCLUSION

The 1935-36 League of Nations' response to Hitler's unilateral denunciation
of key treaty provisions reminds us that, from 1919, discourse in the international
States' system occurred principally inside, a largely new, law-based matrix which
was consciously antithetic to aristocratic honour. The diplomacy of the preceding
centuries had imagined the State as a gentleman with a highly developed sense of
honour, readily vindicated on the battlefield. After the First World War, League of
Nations diplomacy tended to view the State as a middle-class citizen in a world
community, governed by law and committed to the peaceful settlement of
international disputes. This Wilsonian Weltanschauung may have appeared
somewhat naive from the standpoint of 1939, when there had to be amazement at
the prescient realism of Marshall Foch, who in 1919 had known that the Versailles
Treaty was just a twenty years' truce.15 Today, however, Woodrow Wilson seems
the greater prophet, because his compelling vision is consistent with long-term
historical trends showing victories for liberal democratic States which, by their
nature, do not wage war against each other.259 In this light, the abandonment of the
rhetoric of honour can be seen as a healthy step away from the warlike ethos of
aristocratic societies which, at very great cost, inordinately emphasized ideas of
greatness and glory.

258. See MANN, supra note 114, at 903.
259. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at 262-265.

